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JENNINGS V. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH 
CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL: 
TITLE IX, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, 
AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Deanna DeFrancesco*
Sexual harassment . . . was as much a part of my 
athletics routine as practice was.1
INTRODUCTION 
“Sexual harassment is a part of college life, so common that, 
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. Vassar College, 2005. The 
author would like to thank Elizabeth M. Schneider, Rose L. Hoffer Professor 
of Law, Brooklyn Law School, who first introduced her to issues involving 
gender and summary judgment in Civil Procedure class and subsequent 
enlightening conversations. She also provided guidance on this Comment. For 
Professor Schneider’s broader analysis of gender problems in federal civil 
litigation summary judgment practice, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation 
(Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 71), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968834. The author would additionally like to thank 
her family and friends for their unwavering support and encouragement. 
Special thanks to Professor David Reiss, Professor Minna Kotkin, Victoria 
Szymczak, Mary Anne Mendenhall, and the Journal of Law and Policy staff. 
1 Jesse Mendelson, Note, Sexual Harassment in Intercollegiate Athletics 
by Male Coaches of Female Athletes: What it is, What it Means for the 
Future, and What the NCAA Should Do? 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 597, 
616 (2003) (quoting Leslie Heywood, Despite the Positive Rhetoric about 
Women’s Sports, Female Athletes Face a Culture of Sexual Harassment, THE 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1999 (quoting Michelle Hite a former 
college athlete reflecting on her athletics experience and why she ultimately 
forfeited her sports scholarship), available at http://chronicle.com/ 
weekly/v45/i18b00401.htm). 
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according to one student, ‘it seems almost normal.’”2 
Quantifying that sentiment, one poll found that 62% of college 
students have personally faced sexual harassment on campus.3 
Although sexual harassment is prevalent in the college 
environment generally, some scholars argue that it is even more 
widespread in athletics than in the classroom.4 Experts also 
2 CATHERINE HILL AND ELENA SILVA, DRAWING THE LINE: SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 14 (2005), available at http://www.aauw.org/ 
research/DTLFinal.pdf (analyzing findings regarding sexual harassment in 
higher education). 
3 Id. at 15. A guidance manual promulgated by the U.S. Department of 
Education, Office for Civil Rights explains sexual harassment in the 
educational context. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REVISED SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf. The guide defines 
such harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature.” Id. Elaborating 
on this definition, the guide explains that sexual harassment “can include 
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, 
nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Id. 
 Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission maintains: 
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute 
sexual harassment [in the workplace] when (1) submission to 
such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or 
condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or 
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis 
for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such 
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2006). Although there does not appear to be a clear 
legal definition of sexual harassment, courts have relied on the definition set 
forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); Wright v. Rollette County, 417 F.3d 879, 
885 (8th Cir. 2005). 
4 See Karin Volkwein-Caplan, Frauke Schnell, Shannon Devlin, Michele 
Mitchell & Jennifer Sutera, Sexual Harassment of Women in Athletics vs. 
Academia, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ABUSE IN SPORT: INTERNATIONAL 
RESEARCH AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 91, 93 (Celia Brackenridge and Kari 
Fasting eds., 2002) (citing Karin A.E. Volkwein, Frauke I. Schnell, Dennis 
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agree that sexual harassment in sports is both understudied5 and 
underreported.6
Sherwood & Anne Livezey, Sexual Harassment in Sport: Perceptions and 
Experiences of American Female Student-Athletes, 32 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 283 (1997)); Todd W. Crosset, 
Jeffrey R. Benedict, & Mark A. McDonald, Male Student-Athletes Reported 
for Sexual Assault: A Survey of Campus Police Departments and Judicial 
Affairs Offices, JOURNAL OF SPORT AND SOCIAL ISSUES, May 1995, at 126, 
134 (“[M]ale college student-athletes compared with the rest of the male 
student population, are responsible for a significantly higher percentage of the 
sexual assaults reported to judicial affairs offices on the campuses of Division 
I institutions.”); Volkwein et al., supra, at 284 (citing M. Melnick, Male 
Athletes and Sexual Assault, 63 JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION, 
RECREATION, AND DANCE 32 (1992); M. MESSNER & D. SABO, SEX 
VIOLATION, AND POWER IN SPORTS: RETHINKING MASCULINITY (1994); 
MARIAH BURTON NELSON, THE STRONGER WOMEN GET, THE MORE MEN 
LOVE FOOTBALL: SEXISM AND THE AMERICAN CULTURE OF SPORTS (1994)). 
5 See, e.g., Kari Fasting, Celia Brackenridge & Kristin Walseth, 
Consequences of Sexual Harassment in Sport for Female Athletes, in SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT AND ABUSE IN SPORT: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES 47, 48 (Celia Brackenridge and Kari Fasting eds., 2002) 
(“Research on sexual harassment in sports is scarce but has grown steadily 
since the mid-1980s.”) (citations omitted); Nancy Hogshead-Maker & 
Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics’ Unique Environments for 
Sexual Harassment Claims: Balancing the Realities of Athletics with 
Preventing Potential Claims, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 173, 173 (2003) 
(citing Annmarie Pinarski, Note, When Coaches “Cross the Line”: Hostile 
Athletic Environment Sexual Harassment, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 911, 915 
(2000) (citation omitted)) (commenting on the lack of statistics regarding 
sexual harassment and female athletes). 
6 See, e.g., Sandra L. Kirby, Lorraine Greaves, & Olena Hankivsky, 
Women Under the Dome of Silence: Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Female 
Athletes, 21 CANADIAN WOMAN STUDIES 132, pt. 3 132-35 (2002) 
(describing the “‘dome of silence’ [which] exists to keep athletes complacent 
in sport . . . .”); Volkwein et al., supra note 4, at 284 (noting that “official 
reports will tend to underestimate the incidence of sexual harassment and 
sexual assaults that take place on college campuses” for a variety of reasons 
including victims’ decisions to remain silent about harassment and colleges’ 
faulty and under-publicized complaint procedures) (citing Crosset et al., 
supra note 4; Helen Lenskyj, Unsafe at Home Base: Women’s Experience of 
Sexual Harassment in University Sport and Physical Education, 1 WOMEN IN 
SPORT AND PHYSICAL ACTIVITY JOURNAL 19, 21 (1992)). 
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Some scholars attribute these high rates of sexual harassment 
to the uniqueness of the athletic environment.7 First, sexual 
harassment tends to be more rampant “in institutions 
characterized by hierarchical distributions of power”—structures 
which are common in intercollegiate sports environments.8 For 
example, “coaches, the majority of whom are men, hold 
significant power over athletes regarding scholarships, who gets 
to play and who remains on the team.”9 Female athletes at the 
bottom of the hierarchy are, therefore, uniquely susceptible to 
sexual harassment.10
Second, the relationship between coach and athlete is 
characterized by “close bonds” and intimacy.11 Coaches have 
control over personal aspects of athletes’ lives, including health 
and sexual behavior.12 Additionally, as loyalty to the team, 
“[i]ndividual rights in athletics often take a back seat to the 
notion of ‘winning’ and the ‘good of the team.’”13
Third, various aspects of the athletics environment involve 
physical contact.14 For example, coaches and athletes might 
celebrate a victory with a hug.15 At other times, “hands-on” 
teaching and learning are necessary to demonstrate athletic 
skills.16 This unique characteristic heightens the potential for 
improper touching and sexual harassment.17
The experience of Melissa Jennings, a former soccer player 
7 See, e.g., Celia Brackenridge, “He owned me basically . . .” Women’s 
Experience of Sexual Abuse in Sport, 32 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW FOR THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 115, 115, 120-22 (1997); Volkwein et al., supra note 
4, at 285-86. 
8 Volkwein et al., supra note 4, at 285. 
9 Id. at 285-86. 
10 See id. 
11 Id. at 284-85. 
12 Id. at 285 (citing Helen Lenskyj, supra note 6, at 26). 
13 Id. at 285 (citing Helen Lenskyj, supra note 6, at 27). 
14 E.g., Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 5, at 177; Volkwein 
et al., supra note 4, at 285. 
15 Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 5, at 177. 
16 Id.; Volkwein et al., supra note 4, at 285. 
17 Volkwein et al., supra note 4, at 285. 
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for the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, illustrates 
this nexus between the athletics environment and sexual 
harassment. In 1998, Jennings filed suit against the University 
under Title IX.18 Jennings alleged that her coach, Anson 
Dorrance, sexually harassed her while she was a member of the 
team.19 Despite Jennings’ accusations, when the defendants 
moved for summary judgment, the district court granted the 
motion.20 The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that the 
alleged conduct could not be considered severe and pervasive, 
and therefore, did not create a hostile environment under Title 
IX.21
This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit in Jennings 
erred in affirming the district court’s decision granting the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court did not 
properly consider prior Title IX sexual harassment cases and 
failed to appreciate and weigh all of the circumstances 
underlying Jennings’ claim, including the uniqueness of the 
intercollegiate athletics environment. 
Part I provides a backdrop to Jennings’ claims by discussing 
18 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 
2006); Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 340 F. Supp. 2d 666 
(M.D.N.C. 2004). Jennings also filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) 
and state tort law against Dorrance and other University officials. See 
Jennings, 444 F.3d at 259. 
19 Jennings, 444 F.3d. at 259. 
20 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 340 F. Supp. 2d 666, 668 
(M.D.N.C. 2004). 
21 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 275. On the eve of publication, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed this decision en banc holding that “Jennings has presented 
sufficient evidence to raise triable questions of fact on all disputed elements 
of her Title IX claim against UNC, and the district court erred in granting the 
University’s motion for summary judgment.” See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. 
at Chapel Hill, No. 04-2447, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8216, *32-*33, (4th 
Cir. April 9, 2007) (additionally vacating summary judgment on Jennings’ § 
1983 claims against Dorrance and Ehringhaus. Id. *2-*3.). As a result, this 
Comment does not devote the depth of analysis to the latest decision that it 
deserves. Nevertheless, this Comment is a valuable discussion of 
intercollegiate athletics and sexual harassment and serves as further 
justification for this latest, favorable opinion. 
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the history of sexual harassment law and highlighting the 
trajectory of Title IX law and policy, especially as it relates to 
athletics. Part II delineates the facts and procedural aspects of 
the Jennings case. By examining the decision in the context of 
two other cases, Zimmer v. Ashland University22 and Klemencic 
v. Ohio State University,23 Part III argues that the Jennings 
court improperly affirmed the district court’s judgment 
dismissing the Title IX claim. Part IV then discusses the issue of 
summary judgment and sexual harassment. It contends that 
Jennings illustrates the improper use of summary judgment to 
decide these cases, a problem identified by many scholars. This 
Comment concludes by joining these scholars in urging courts to 
exercise more caution in dismissing such claims within this 
procedural context. 
I.  SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW24
A.  Title VII: The Precursor to Title IX25
Until the middle of the twentieth century, laws offered 
22 No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
23 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
24 The purpose of this Comment is not to outline a full history of sexual 
harassment law. It sets out only to briefly provide readers with a general 
background in order to contextualize and facilitate an understanding of this 
Comment. Also for this reason, Section B of this Part, which discusses Title 
IX, does not focus on the aspects of the law that do not involve sexual 
harassment, such as the Cohen line of cases, which deal with the funding of 
athletics programs. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 
1993). 
25 For a more extensive examination of the history of Title VII see 
MARGARET A. CROUCH, THINKING ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A GUIDE 
FOR THE PERPLEXED (Oxford University Press 2001); CATHERINE 
MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 162-183 (2005); Reva B. 
Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 1, 1-26 (Catherine A. MacKinnon and Reva B. Siegel, eds., 
2004). 
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victims of sexual harassment little reprieve.26 Though state rape 
laws criminalized such abuse, women faced excessive burdens in 
proving their cases.27 “[T]he law assumed that women in fact 
wanted the sexual advances and assaults that they claimed 
injured them.”28 Tort law also fell short of adequate protection 
for sexual assault.29
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.30 
This act made it unlawful “for an employer . . . to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”31 In 
the years following the enactment of Title VII, sex 
discrimination cases which came before the courts involved 
“discriminatory policies,” such as height and weight 
requirements directed only at women.32
As a result of the efforts of feminist activists who “laid the 
foundation” for this cause of action,33 the courts finally 
26 See Siegel, supra note 25, at 3-5. 
27 Id. at 4. 
28 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
29 Id. at 5 (explaining that early common law permitted sexual assault 
claims to the extent that they “inflicted an injury on a man’s property interest 
in the woman who was assaulted.”). 
30 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I). 
32 CROUCH, supra note 25, at 38 (citing Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 
366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 567 F.2d 
429 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
33 See MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 165 (“[T]he civil rights 
movements in general, and the women’s movement in particular, laid the 
foundation for the recognition of sexual harassment as a practice of 
inequality” (internal footnotes omitted).); Siegel, supra note 25, at 8 
(explaining: 
In the 1970’s Catherine MacKinnon and Lin Farley and the 
many other lawyers and activists who represented women in and 
out of court were able to mount a concerted assault, of 
unprecedented magnitude and force, on the practice of sexual 
harassment. 
 . . . . 
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recognized sexual harassment as a viable claim under Title VII 
over a decade after its passage.34 The court developed two 
theories of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile 
environment. The quid pro quo theory originated in Williams v. 
Saxbe, which involved a female employee who was fired after 
she refused the sexual demands of her supervisor.35 The court 
held that “retaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken because 
a female employee declined his sexual advances, constitutes [sic] 
sex discrimination within the definitional parameters of Title 
VII . . . .”36 Later, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,37 
the Supreme Court recognized the hostile environment theory.38 
In defining hostile environment, the Meritor Court looked to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Guidelines.39 It stated, “sexual 
misconduct constitutes prohibited ‘sexual harassment,’ whether 
or not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic 
quid pro quo, where ‘such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance 
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment.’”40 Today, a plaintiff may assert one or both 
. . . Sexual harassment law arose, first and foremost, from 
women acting as part of a social movement speaking out about 
their experiences as women at work; the term “sexual 
harassment” itself grew out of a consciousness-raising session 
Lin Farley held in 1974 as part of a Cornell University course 
on women and work.). 
34 See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom, Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
See also MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 162 (citing Williams as the first case 
to permit a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII). 
35 Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 655. 
36 Id. at 657. 
37 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1985). 
38 See id. at 67. The plaintiff in Meritor alleged that she had been forced 
to yield to the sexual advances of her supervisor out of fear that he would 
fire her. He also inappropriately touched her and showed his genitalia to her 
on other occasions. See id. at 60. 
39 See id. at 65. 
40 Id. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1985)) (emphasis in 
original). 
DEANNA.DOC 7/1/2007 11:01 PM 
 TITLE IX AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1279 
                                                          
theories in a sexual harassment lawsuit.41
B.  Title IX: The Protection of Students, Athletes, and 
Employees in Educational and Athletics 
Environments42
Building on Title VII, Congress passed Title IX of the 
Education Amendments in 1972 in order to promote equality of 
opportunity in educational environments.43 This legislation 
mandates that “no person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”44 Like Title VII, Title IX creates a remedy for 
victims of sexual harassment which occurs in educational 
institutions.45
In 1977, Alexander v. Yale University46 presented the first 
opportunity for a court to rule on sexual harassment under Title 
IX.47 Numerous plaintiffs, including five female students and a 
male faculty member, alleged that the University’s “failure to 
combat sexual harassment of female students and its refusal to 
41 See Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 
1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001). In Klemencic, the plaintiff 
asserted her sexual harassment claim based on both theories. Id. at 914. See 
also Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15075, *2 (N.D. Ohio 2001). In Zimmer, the plaintiff asserted her sexual 
harassment claim based only on the hostile environment theory. Id. 
42 For a more extensive examination of the history of Title IX see, e.g., 
CROUCH, supra note 25; LINDA JEAN CARPENTER & R. VIVIAN ACOSTA, 
TITLE IX (2005); David Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. 
J. L. & GENDER 217 (2005); Martha McCarthy, Students as Victims of Sexual 
Harassment: The Evolving Law, 27 J. L. & EDUC. 401 (1998). 
43 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2006). 
44 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
45 CROUCH, supra note 25, at 70. 
46 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff’d, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). 
For a discussion of Alexander see Anne E. Simon, Alexander v. Yale 
University: An Informal History, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW 51 (Catherine A. MacKinnon and Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2004). 
47 CROUCH, supra note 25, at 70. 
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institute mechanisms and procedures to address complaints and 
make investigations of such harassment interferes with the 
educational process and denies equal opportunity in education” 
under Title IX.48 Although the court dismissed each of the 
plaintiffs’ claims but one,49 it held that sexual harassment is 
sexual discrimination in violation of Title IX.50 Almost a decade 
later, the Third Circuit in Moire v. Temple University School of 
Medicine51 recognized the hostile environment theory in a Title 
IX case.52
In 1992, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools53 
introduced the Supreme Court to its first Title IX sexual 
harassment case.54 In addition to affirming Cannon v. University 
of Chicago,55 which recognized a private right of action under 
Title IX,56 the Court held that plaintiffs may seek damages for 
48 Alexander, 459 F. Supp. at 2. 
49 Id. at 6-7 (“Plaintiff Price’s complaint may not be dismissed on its 
face despite failure to seek any administrative recourse whatsoever, since 
ordinarily beneficial and fair requirements of administrative exhaustion should 
not be imposed absent realistic possibility of a meaningful remedy.”). 
Although her claim did not ultimately succeed, the Second Circuit later 
agreed with the district court that “only plaintiff Price presented a justiciable 
claim for relief under Title IX.” See Alexander, 631 F.2d at 185. 
50 Alexander, 459 F. Supp. at 6-7 (“[I]t is perfectly reasonable to 
maintain that academic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual 
demands constitutes sex discrimination in education, just as questions of job 
retention or promotion tied to sexual demands from supervisors have become 
increasingly recognized as potential violations of Title VII’s ban against sex 
discrimination in employment”). The one complaint that the court did not 
dismiss alleged a more “quid pro quo” type of harassment in that the Plaintiff 
claimed to have received a poor grade as a result of rejecting her professor’s 
sexual proposition. The other claimants alternatively claimed a more “hostile 
environment” type of harassment. CROUCH, supra note 25, at 70. 
51 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff’d, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
52 CROUCH, supra note 25, at 70. 
53 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
54 Franklin, 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
55 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). 
56 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63-64. 
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sexual harassment by a teacher.57 In Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District58 and Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education,59 the Court began to develop standards for 
evaluating institutional liability for teacher-student harassment.60 
Gebser held that schools are not liable for sexual harassment 
unless they had “actual notice of” and were “deliberately 
indifferent to” the misconduct.61 Davis extended this standard 
for liability to peer harassment.62
As a result of years of jurisprudence on these issues, in 
order to successfully allege a Title IX violation on the basis of 
the hostile environment theory, four elements must be 
established.63 First, the complainant must be a member of the 
class of individuals protected under the Act.64 For example, the 
plaintiff must be a student at an educational institution which 
receives federal funding. Second, she must have been “subjected 
to harassment based on her sex.”65 Third, the harassment must 
57 Id. at 65, 76. 
58 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
59 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
60 Anne-Marie Harris & Kenneth B. Grooms, A New Lesson Plan for 
Educational Institutions: Expanded Rules Governing Liability under Title IX 
of the Educational Amendments of 1972 for Student and Faculty Harassment, 
8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 575, 587 (2000). 
61 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277. 
62 Davis, 526 U.S. at 644-45 (applying the Gebser standard to a peer 
harassment case and finding “[i]f a funding recipient does not engage in 
harassment directly, it may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate 
indifference ‘subjects’ its students to harassment”). 
63 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 225, 267-68 
(4th Cir. 2006). Some courts may expand these elements into five, but they, 
nevertheless, maintain the same fundamental requirements. See, e.g., Frazier 
v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2002) (requiring five 
elements and separating the second element into two); Donovan v. Mount Ida 
College, No. 96-10289-RGS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23048, *12 (D. Mass. 
1997) (requiring five elements adding that the sexual harassment must have 
been unwelcome). 
64 E.g., Jennings, 444 F.3d at 267-68; Frazier, 276 F.3d at 66; 
Donovan, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23048, at *12. 
65 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 268. E.g., Frazier, 276 F.3d at 66; Hayut v. 
State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 748 (2d Cir. 2003); Donovan, 1997 U.S. 
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have been sufficiently “severe and pervasive to create an abusive 
educational environment.”66 Fourth, the plaintiff must show that 
there is a “basis for imputing institutional liability under Title 
IX.”67 Under this element, a school official with sufficient 
power to ameliorate the situation must have had “actual notice 
of, and [have been] deliberately indifferent to, the . . . 
misconduct.”68
In examining the third element regarding the severity and 
pervasiveness of the conduct,69 the courts look to the history of 
Title VII for guidance.70 Like Title VII analyses, courts apply 
this standard from a “subjective and objective perspective.”71 
Courts also consider the “constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships” of the underlying 
claim.72 Thus, in analyzing a hostile environment claim, courts 
look to the totality of circumstances in order to decipher 
actionable harassment. No single factor is determinative.73
Dist. LEXIS 23048, at *12. 
66 Frazier, 276 F.3d at 66. See, e.g., Jennings, 444 F.3d at 268; 
Donovan, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23048, at *12. 
67 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 268. See, e.g., Frazier, 276 F.3d at 66; 
Donovan, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23048, at *12. 
68 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998). 
69 This Comment focuses on the severe and pervasive element because it 
is central to the Jennings analysis. 
70 See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 
(1999) (looking to the Title VII case Meritor for guidance on the severe and 
pervasive standard in deciding a Title IX case); Hayut, 352 F.3d at 745 
(citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc, 510 U.S. 17 (1993), a Title VII case). 
71 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. See also Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-788 (1998) (reaffirming the “subjective and 
objective standard” set out in Harris); Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel 
Hill, 444 F.3d 225, 270 (4th Cir. 2006). 
72 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. 
73 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. 
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II.  JENNINGS V. UNC AT CHAPEL HILL—THE FACTS74 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has long 
been the home of “the best women’s soccer program in the 
country.”75 The head coach since 1979,76 Anson Dorrance led 
his teams to over twenty national championships and also served 
as coach for the U.S. Women’s National Team.77 Women 
interested in playing soccer “would ‘cut off their right arm to be 
at [UNC]’ and play for Dorrance.”78
In August 1996, when she was seventeen years old, Melissa 
Jennings made the women’s varsity soccer team as a “walk-on” 
to play goalkeeper.79 Though Jennings did not have an athletics 
scholarship, some of her teammates did.80 In May 1998, 
Dorrance cut Jennings from the team.81
Jennings alleged that Dorrance, who was forty-five years old 
at the time, “made sexual comments and inquiries ‘on a regular 
basis’” during her two years with the team.82 Some of Jennings’ 
teammates affirmed her claims.83 For example, Debbie Keller, 
the team captain, confirmed that “Dorrance would make 
inappropriate sexual comments to players ‘anytime the team was 
together,’ whether ‘on a plane, in a car, or on a bus, in a hotel, 
74 Because the case was decided in the context of summary judgment, 
each of Jennings’ allegations will be considered “facts” for the purpose of 
this Comment. 
75 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 283 (Michael, J., dissenting). This Comment 
cites to the dissent in order to fully convey Jennings’ allegations. 
76 Id. at 259 (majority opinion). 
77 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 283 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 259 (majority opinion). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 263. 
82 Id. at 283 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
83 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 283 
(Michael, J., dissenting). 
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at practice, out of town, [or] at events.’”84 In addition, Amy 
Steelman, another player on the team, testified that 
“when Anson Dorrance was around, he would encourage and 
participate in sexual discussions, sexual jokes, sexual talk, 
sexual banter, and sexual innuendos. A typical Monday 
afternoon included queries and discussions with Anson Dorrance 
into the team members’ sexual . . . exploits . . . .”85
Jennings also claimed that Dorrance made inappropriate 
sexual comments while the team warmed up before they began 
their practice for the day.86 During this “warm-up” time, the 
players would talk about various aspects of their lives. Some 
team members comfortably discussed even their sex lives; 
however, other players, such as Jennings, did not.87 Jennings 
described Dorrance’s involvement in these “warm-up” 
conversations as frequent.88
More specifically, Jennings alleged: 
[n]early every day or every other day, he inquired of 
one player in front of the entire team, “Who [her] 
fuck of the minute is, fuck of the hour is, fuck of the 
week [is],” whether there was a “guy [she] hadn’t 
fucked yet,” and whether she “got the guys’ names as 
they came to the door or whether she just took a 
number.”89
After learning that one player’s boyfriend was planning to 
visit her, he asked if “she was going to have a ‘shag fest . . . ’ 
[with] her boyfriend . . . [or] whether she ‘was going to fuck 
him and leave him.’”90 To other players he asked similarly 
84 Id. at 283 (Michael, J., dissenting); see also id. at 260 (majority 
opinion). 
85 Id. at 260. 
86 Id. These practices occurred everyday, except Sundays and days on 
which they played games. Id. at 259. 
87 Id. at 260 (majority opinion) (referencing the previous sentence as 
well), 289 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. 260 (majority opinion). 
89 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 283 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 284. 
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crude questions, such as “who a team member’s ‘[fuck] of the 
week’ is,”91 and whether one player “was ‘going to have sex 
with the entire lacrosse team.’”92
On another occasion, Dorrance told Keller that he wanted to 
watch her teammate have sex when she lost her virginity.93 
Keller, shocked, told this to Jennings.94 Another time, Jennings 
overheard Dorrance discussing his fantasy about “‘an Asian 
threesome’ with his Asian players.”95
Additionally, Dorrance made improper comments about the 
girls’ bodies. For example, he used words such as “nice legs,” 
“nice racks,” “breasts bouncing,” “top heavy,” “fat ass,” 
“described how their ‘asses [looked] in spandex’ . . . , remarked 
on one player’s ‘dimples and . . . cuteness,’ . . . and called 
another ‘Chuck’ because he suspected that she was a lesbian.”96
Steelman alleged that Dorrance directed “inordinate 
attention” at Keller in front of the other players.97 She described 
how he would “‘[put] his arm around her shoulder,’ ‘[dangle] 
his hand in front of her chest,’ and ‘[touch] her hair.’”98 
According to Steelman, Keller’s nonverbal communication 
indicated her “strong discomfort.”99
On other occasions, Dorrance specifically targeted Jennings. 
While at an out-of-state tournament in 1996, Dorrance invited 
his players into his hotel room for individual meetings. During 
these private encounters, he discussed each player’s athletic 
performance. When meeting with Jennings, he first explained 
that her place on the team was in danger due to her poor 
grades.100 Next, Jennings recounted, Dorrance suddenly asked, 
91 Id. at 262 (majority opinion). 
92 Id. at 284 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 276 (majority opinion). 
94 See id. at 276 (majority opinion), 284 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
95 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 284 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 277 (majority opinion). 
98 Id. at 284 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 262-63 (majority opinion) (referencing prior sentences as well). 
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“Who are you fucking?”101 Jennings responded, “[N]one of 
[your] God damn business.”102 Jennings later described the 
atmosphere of the meeting, “I was 17 when he asked me [“Who 
I was fucking?”] in a dark hotel room, knee-to-knee, bed not 
made, sitting at one of those tiny tables.”103 In a separate 
incident, while discussing a player’s “shag fest,” as described by 
Dorrance, the coach pried, “Yes, what about [Jennings]?” when 
a team member mentioned that Jennings too had visited her 
boyfriend during that time.104 Jennings “felt humiliated and did 
not respond.”105
As a result of the overly sexual environment shaped by 
Dorrance, Jennings lived in constant fear of his attention, and 
like other players, whom he drove to tears, Jennings felt 
“uncomfortable, filthy and humiliated.”106 Other players, 
similarly offended by Dorrance, also shared Jennings’ shock and 
discontent.107 In response to Dorrance’s actions and words, 
some even commented, “I can’t believe he would say that.”108 
Despite this atmosphere, Jennings described the predicament that 
players faced: “if they gave any sort of opposition . . . [their] 
playing time [would be] gone, their career [would be] gone.”109
Dorrance’s behavior made Jennings so uncomfortable that 
she turned to Susan Ehringhaus, the Assistant to the Chancellor 
and Senior University Counsel, for guidance.110 Jennings 
expressed a number of complaints against Dorrance, including 
that he refused to reimburse her for $400 worth of Gatorade he 
had forced her to buy, made sexual comments to the athletes, 
101 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 285 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 285 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 284-85. 
107 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 289 
(4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 285. 
109 Id. 
110 See id. at 262 (majority opinion), 285 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
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inquired into the sex lives of players, and encouraged her to 
attend parties where underage drinking occurred.111 The only 
advice Ehringhaus offered Jennings was “to talk with Dorrance 
about all of these issues.”112
Later in May 1998, despite Jennings’ belief that her soccer 
skills and her grades were improving, Dorrance cut her from the 
team.113 Days later, the school received a letter from Jennings’ 
father expressing his concern with Dorrance’s behavior.114 He 
complained of Dorrance prying into the players’ and his 
daughter’s sex lives. Specifically, he said he found 
“inappropriate and harassing” Dorrance’s typical inquiries, such 
as “[a]re you shacking up with him? . . . Who is shacking up 
with whom? [and] . . . [W]ho her s[hag] for the week 
is/was?”115
After the University received this letter, school officials 
began an investigation.116 These officials later alerted Jennings’ 
father that Dorrance had come to a realization that his actions 
were “inappropriate, and [that] he [would] immediately 
discontinue that activity.”117 Dorrance endorsed the school’s 
letter apologizing to Jennings.118
Approximately three months after the school’s investigation, 
Jennings filed suit against the University and Dorrance.119 After 
word of this lawsuit spread, students threatened her safety both 
in person and via telephone.120 These constant threats forced 
Jennings to transfer to another school for her senior year.121
111 Id. at 262 (majority opinion). 
112 Id. 
113 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 263 (4th 
Cir. 2006). 
114 Id. at 264. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 265. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 265 (4th 
Cir. 2006). 
120 Id. at 286 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
121 Id. 
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Despite Jennings’ allegations, when the defendants moved 
for summary judgment, the district court granted their motion 
holding that Dorrance’s conduct was not sufficiently “severe, 
pervasive and objectively offensive . . . .”122 The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the judgment.123
III.  THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN DISMISSING JENNINGS V. 
UNC AT CHAPEL HILL ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This Part deconstructs the “severe and pervasive” standard 
as applied to cases in which complaints alleged that harassment 
occurred between coaches and athletes at the intercollegiate 
level. Specifically, this Part examines the Jennings court’s 
analysis and application of this standard in light of two other 
cases, Zimmer v. Ashland University124 and Klemencic v. Ohio 
State University.125 These cases directly address the coach-
athlete relationship at the intercollegiate sports level and involve 
the severe and pervasive standard.126 In addition, this Part looks 
122 340 F. Supp. 2d 666, 675. Although the district court applied the 
“severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” standard, the Fourth Circuit 
reviewed Jennings’ claims under the “severe and pervasive standard.” 
Jennings, 444 F.3d at 268 n.8. In considering which standard to use, the 
court concluded that because Jennings’ claims did not meet even the lower 
“severe and pervasive” inquiry, it need not determine whether the heightened 
standard established in Davis, a peer harassment case, applies to teacher-
student cases. Id. 
123 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 259. 
124 No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
125 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 
2001). The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision on the grounds 
that Klemencic failed to appeal a jury verdict, which found that Coach 
Crawford did not subject her to quid pro quo harassment, and the decision 
granting summary judgment in favor of Crawford. Hence, the Sixth Circuit 
found that “Klemencic [was] precluded from establishing the first element of 
her prima facie case—that she experienced either quid pro quo sexual 
harassment or a sexually hostile environment at the hands of Crawford.” Id. 
at 511. Because the Sixth Circuit could not reevaluate the lower court’s 
analysis on these final decisions, this Comment uses the lower court’s 
decision to illustrate its argument. 
126 Research revealed only two cases directly relevant to this analysis: 
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to the Jennings dissent both as illustrative of the majority’s 
shortcomings and as a proper guide in analyzing various issues. 
This Comment hopes to uncover how the unique athletic 
environment impacts the courts’ analyses. Also, by 
deconstructing the “severe and pervasive” standard and 
examining Jennings in view of the related case law, this Part 
critiques the Jennings court’s analysis. It ultimately concludes 
that Jennings’ allegations should have survived under this 
standard. 
A.  Zimmer and Klemencic: The Facts 
1.  Zimmer v. Ashland University127
Kelly Zimmer was a swimmer on the Ashland University 
swim team from 1997-1999.128 After her first year, Zimmer was 
happy with her grades and athletic performance on the team.129 
However, when Coach Baugh joined the team in 1998, Zimmer 
found it increasingly difficult to perform.130 Zimmer attributed 
Zimmer, No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075 and Klemencic, 10 
F.Supp. 2d 911. For other cases involving coach-athlete harassment at the 
intercollegiate level that do not deal with the severe and pervasive standard 
see Turner v. McQuarter, 79 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Ericson v. 
Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). For cases involving 
coach-athlete harassment at the interscholastic level see Riddick v. Sch. Bd. 
of the City of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Rains 
County Indep. Sch. Dist., 76 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1996); HM & MM v. 
Jefferson County Bd. of Ed., 719 So. 2d 793 (D. Ala. 1999); Doe v. Green, 
298 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Nev. 2004); Seneway v. Canon McMillan Sch. 
Dist., 969 F. Supp. 325 (W.D. Pa. 1997). For cases involving peer 
harassment in intercollegiate athletics see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic 
Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Geor., 441 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Colo. 2005). 
127 No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
128 Id. at *4, *8-*9. 
129 Id. at *4. 
130 Id. at *7. 
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her poor performance to Baugh’s inappropriate conduct and 
physical and verbal abuse. For example, Zimmer complained 
that he 
felt her back and legs on the pool deck when she had 
hives; . . . told Zimmer that she has nice legs, no 
butt, and that “[she] looks good,” . . . stared at 
Zimmer’s chest several times . . . and said, ‘Kelly, I 
see you are cold today’ (in reference to her 
breasts); . . . made Zimmer stay after practice so that 
he could ice her shoulder while they were alone; 
[and] pulled Zimmer’s bathing suit strap down to her 
bicep while icing her shoulder.131
Other members of the team experienced similar conduct.132  
 Although Zimmer and other team members complained of 
Baugh’s behavior to school officials, as well as to him 
personally, the harassment did not stop.133 As a result of her 
coach’s conduct, Zimmer suffered from post-traumatic stress 
disorder.134 Her grades also fell.135 Subsequently, Zimmer 
initiated a Title IX suit under the hostile environment theory.136 
The court declined to grant the defendant’s summary judgment 
motion and permitted Zimmer’s hostile environment claim to 
proceed to trial.137
131 Id. at *5-*6. 
132 See id. at *31 n.3. The court noted some specific examples of sexual 
harassment experienced by other members of the team: 
Baugh asking when he would see a swimmer in a sexy dress, 
hitting a swimmer on the back-end with a kickboard, fixing a 
swimmer’s twisted suit straps when he had not been asked to do 
so, entering the women’s locker room area while the team was 
changing, and taking excessive photographs of the women team 
members. 
Id. 
133 See Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 US Dist. 
LEXIS 15075, at *7-*8 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
134 Id. at *10. 
135 Id. at *9. 
136 Id. at *2. 
137 See id. at *32 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
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2.  Klemencic v. Ohio State University138
Denise Klemencic was an athlete on the Women’s Track and 
Cross Country Teams at Ohio State University from 1990-1992, 
after which her eligibility to play sports ended.139 Thomas 
Crawford, who served as Assistant Coach for the teams from 
1990-1993, coached Klemencic.140 Crawford offered to allow 
Klemencic to continue training with the team after her eligibility 
expired.141
In 1992, Klemencic claimed “Crawford ‘disclosed . . . that 
he wanted a sexual relationship with her.”142 He made a similar 
request on a separate occasion.143 Klemencic, however, refused 
both requests.144 Subsequently, Crawford refused to allow 
Klemencic to train with the team as he had promised her.145 In 
the same month, Klemencic reported Crawford’s inappropriate 
conduct to school authorities, who reprimanded him.146
Klemencic complained of other conduct. Crawford 
persistently interfered in Klemencic’s personal life by intruding 
on her relationship with her boyfriend and offering her rides 
home and the option to live with him.147 Crawford also gave 
Klemencic a sexually suggestive tabloid article.148
138 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 
2001). 
139 Id. at 912. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 913. Although Klemencic was not technically “part of the 
team” because her athletic ability expired, her relationship with Crawford, 
who offered her the opportunity to train with the team, still illustrates the 
athlete-coach dynamic central to the analysis of this Comment. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 913. 
144 Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913 (S.D. Ohio 
1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 916. 
148 Id. at 914. It does not appear that Klemencic reported the sexually 
explicit article. Id. 
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Subsequently, Klemencic filed a Title IX sexual harassment 
claim based on the hostile environment theory.149 The court, 
however, granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
on the basis that the conduct was not sufficiently severe and 
pervasive.150
B.  The Factors 
In order to determine whether allegations in a hostile 
environment case are severe and pervasive, courts look to the 
totality of the circumstances.151 In doing so, the courts in 
Jennings, Klemencic, and Zimmer examined a variety of factors: 
the role of the harasser, including emphasis on the power of the 
harasser; the age of the harasser; the plaintiff’s own reaction to 
the offensive conduct, including whether a complaint was made 
and the effect of the behavior on the plaintiff; the reactions of 
witnesses to the offensive conduct, including remarks and 
behavior directed at others; the setting in which the alleged 
harassment took place; whether the harassment was direct or 
“second-hand;” and last, other characteristics of the conduct, 
including the frequency, the type, such as whether it was 
physical or verbal and of a sexual nature, and the tone.152 No 
149 Id. at 914. Klemencic also based her claim on the quid pro quo 
theory of sexual harassment. Id. at 912. 
150 Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916, 918 (S.D. 
Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001). 
151 See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 
(1999); Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F. 3d 255, 267 (4th 
Cir. 2006). 
152 See, e.g., Jennings, 444 F.3d 255; Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 
1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075 (N.D. Ohio 2001); Klemencic, 
10 F. Supp. 2d 911. Each court did not examine each factor. Rather the 
factors which this Comment addresses are a combination from the three 
cases. Nancy Hogshead-Makar and Sheldon Elliot Steinbach note that in 
evaluating the “severity and pervasiveness” of the allegations in violation of 
Title IX generally, the Office of Civil Rights considers a number of these 
factors as well as others such as “[t]he size of the school [and] . . . [o]ther 
incidents at the school.” See Hogshead-Makar & Steinbach, supra note 5, at 
184-85. In addition, Diane Heckman provides an extensive checklist of 
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case has held that any factor is determinative. 
1.  The Role of the Harasser 
The role of the harasser is essential to a sexual harassment 
analysis under Title IX.153 Because one’s position or role in 
society entails certain expectations, behaviors that are acceptable 
for some people are entirely inappropriate for others.154 
factors that courts consider in Title IX sexual harassment cases. Diane 
Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment Matters Involving 
Students and Student-Athletes in the Post Davis Era, 206 ED. LAW REP. 469, 
477-99 (2006). Indeed, courts too have attempted to provide a checklist of 
factors which they consider in examining sexual harassment cases. See 
Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075, at *27. However, the analysis of 
this Comment focuses on factors specifically addressed in Title IX 
intercollegiate athletics cases between athletes and coaches. 
153 See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (distinguishing between teachers 
and peers in evaluating sexual harassment); Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15075, at *31. See also SANDRA KIRBY, LORRAINE GREAVES, & ELENA 
HANKINSKY, THE DOME OF SILENCE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ABUSE IN 
SPORT 125-26 (2000); KARIN A.E. VOLKWEIN-CAPLAN & GOPAL SANKARAN, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SPORT: IMPACT, ISSUES, AND CHALLENGES 20-22 
(2002); Volkwein et al., Sexual Harassment in Sport, supra note 4, at 284-
86. 
154 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) 
(“A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or 
pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as 
he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be 
experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the 
office.”). The Jennings court also elaborated on the unusual role of a coach: 
A typical college coach is going to have much more informal, 
casual, one-on-one contact with a student-athlete than a typical 
university instructor will have with a student. College sports 
often involve long daily practice sessions, overnight travel, . . . 
and the need for a coach to discuss issues associated with 
academic performance, athletics performance, and health . . . 
Additionally, . . . a college coach is much more likely to 
demonstrate an athletic move with a hands-on 
demonstration . . . Likewise, some coaches will use profanity, 
slang, sarcasm, or hamhanded humor. . . . 
Jennings, 444 F.3d at 274. 
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Additionally, certain roles, such as coach, involve significant 
power.155
In Zimmer, the court identified this power imbalance in the 
relationship between athlete Zimmer and Coach Baugh. The 
court explained, “Baugh clearly held a powerful position with 
respect to Zimmer, since he controlled her scholarship and acted 
as her varsity swim coach.”156 In concluding that a jury could 
find that Zimmer had been subjected to a hostile environment, 
the court also specifically highlighted the power differential 
between the athlete and the coach as an essential factor among 
the other circumstances.157 Thus, the significant power that 
Baugh wielded over his athletes weighed heavily in the court’s 
ultimate decision. 
Interestingly, the Klemencic court failed to consider this 
essential factor despite its evident importance in Title IX 
analyses, including those of the Supreme Court.158 Because 
In other words, because of the nature of a coach’s position, certain behaviors 
would be acceptable for him though they would not be condoned for someone 
in another role, such as a professor. 
155 See, e.g., Jennings, 444 F.3d at 274; Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15075, at *31; SANDRA KIRBY, LORRAINE GREAVES, & ELENA 
HANKINSKY, supra note 153, at 125; KARIN A.E. VOLKWEIN-CAPLAN & 
GOPAL SANKARAN, supra note 153, at 20-22; Volkwein et al., Sexual 
Harassment in Sport, supra note 4, at 284-86. 
156 Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075, at *31. 
157 Id. (holding “[t]he surrounding circumstances and power differential 
between Zimmer and Baugh could also lead a jury to conclude that a hostile 
educational environment existed for Zimmer”). 
158 See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (explaining this factor by 
discussing the relationship between the harasser and the victim: “[t]he 
relationship between the harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent 
to which the misconduct can be said to breach Title IX’s guarantee of equal 
access to educational benefits and to have a systemic effect on a program or 
activity. Peer harassment, in particular, is less likely to satisfy these 
requirements than is teacher-student harassment.”); Doe v. Green, 298 F. 
Supp. 2d 1025, 1037 (D. Nev. 2004). In Doe, the court denied the 
teacher/coach’s motion for summary judgment in an interscholastic, Title IX 
hostile environment case. The Court cited Davis in explaining the central 
importance of the relationship between the victim and the harasser in its 
hostile environment analysis. Doe, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1037. See also 
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Klemencic admitted to having been friends with Crawford, the 
court characterized their relationship as a “good friendship” 
ignoring the fact that the hierarchical coach-athlete dynamic still 
existed between them.159 By framing the relationship in this 
way, the court dismantled the inherent power imbalance at the 
core of the allegations and described the coach’s inquiries as 
merely unwanted and innocent requests for a date from a social 
equal, which is a characterization that is far less shocking and 
offensive. Although the court improperly considered the athlete-
coach relationship, this case illustrates the importance of the 
power factor in the overall analysis. If the court does not 
perceive a power imbalance, it may weigh strongly against a 
finding of harassment. 
Although the Jennings court ostensibly acknowledged the 
unique role of the coach and the inherent power differential 
between coaches and athletes,160 it inappropriately 
underemphasized this factor. First, the majority opinion failed to 
consider that Dorrance “was in fact more than a regular 
coach.”161 In fact, “he was and still is the most successful 
women’s soccer coach in U.S. history and a former national 
team coach.”162 Accordingly, Dorrance in essence controlled the 
fate of the athletes’ soccer careers, not only at the university 
level, but also professionally. Athletes in general are especially 
susceptible to a coach’s abuse of power,163 and the significant 
Pinarski, supra note 5, at 924 (arguing that the application of Title VII 
standards in athlete-coach harassment cases may be in part to blame for the 
Klemencic court’s shortcomings). 
159 See Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916 (S.D. 
Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001). 
160 The court recognized that a college coach controls players’ positions 
on the team, the amount of time they play in games, and scholarships. See 
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 274 (4th Cir. 
2006). 
161 See id. at 290 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
162 Id. 
163 See, e.g., Volkwein et. al, supra note 4, at 284-85; Rhonda Reaves, 
“There’s No Crying in Baseball:” Sports and the Legal and Social 
Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 283, 297 (2001) 
(discussing the significant power held by coaches which makes athletes 
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degree of power that Dorrance held made the athletes 
particularly vulnerable.164
The majority’s characterization of another aspect of 
Jennings’ story further illustrates how it failed to appreciate 
Dorrance’s power and role. Rather than acknowledging that 
Dorrance’s comments and conduct may have been arguably 
more acceptable from one of Jennings’ peers as opposed to a 
coach and authority figure,165 the court seemed to condone the 
behavior for this very reason. For instance, the court 
highlighted, “[t]ellingly, Jennings [did] . . . not appear to object 
to some of her teammates talking about their sex lives.”166 
While the Klemencic logic, though flawed, may have supported 
this reasoning, the majority did not find the relationship between 
Jennings and Dorrance to be a “good friendship.” Therefore, the 
relationship between the two could not be confused as one of 
social equals, which would perhaps permit such exchanges and 
behavior. 
In contrast, the dissent properly interpreted this scenario: 
“just because some of the young women willingly and openly 
discussed their sexual activities among themselves [did] not mean 
they were comfortable having those discussions with 
Dorrance.”167 The dissent, thus, acknowledged the implications 
of Dorrance’s role and located a power imbalance between the 
athletes and their coach. By framing the athlete-coach 
relationship in this way, it becomes more apparent that 
Dorrance’s conduct constituted harassment. 
The Jennings court also failed to appreciate the significance 
of the “trust” which Dorrance had established between himself 
and the players, further exacerbating the power differential 
vulnerable to sexual abuse). 
164 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 290 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
165 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651-52 
(1999) (discussing the uniqueness of peer harassment though not comparing it 
directly to the coach-athlete relationship). 
166 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 272 (4th 
Cir. 2006). 
167 Id. at 290 (Michael, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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between them.168 Dorrance presented himself to the players as a 
“father figure.”169 By creating such a trusting relationship, 
Dorrance could more easily manipulate the players.170 As the 
dissent explained, “Dorrance took advantage of . . . his position 
of power to crossover from routine teasing into real sexual 
harassment.”171 As the players grew to trust Dorrance, he 
inappropriately compelled them to open up about their sexual 
lives and then later used that information to humiliate them.172 
Overall, the majority, in stark contrast to the dissent, failed to 
acknowledge and weigh Dorrance’s powerful role as coach in its 
analysis. 
2.  The Age of the Harasser 
Related to the role and power factors, courts consider the 
age of the harasser in analyzing hostile environment 
allegations.173 Typically, when a plaintiff brings a Title IX 
hostile environment claim against a coach, the harasser is older 
than the victim.174 Age gaps exacerbate a coach’s already 
powerful position over his younger athletes.175
In Zimmer, the court relied upon the Supreme Court decision 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, a student-on-
student case of harassment, to shed light on the importance of 
age as a factor in determining actionable sexual harassment.176 
168 See id. at 291-92. 
169 Id. 
170 See Reaves, supra note 163 at 296-97 (citation omitted). 
171 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 291 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
172 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F. 3d 255, 291-92 
(4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
173 See id. at 267, 274 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999)) (majority opinion); Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., 
No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075, at *30-*31 (N.D. Ohio 
2001). 
174 Reaves, supra note 163, at 298; Jennings, 444 F.3d at 274. 
175 Reaves, supra note 163, at 297-98. 
176 See Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075, at *30 (quoting Davis, 
526 U.S. at 653). 
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In Davis, the Court stated, “[p]eer harassment . . . is less likely 
to satisfy . . . [Title IX] requirements than is teacher-student 
harassment.”177 Hence, where the harasser is much older than 
the victim, the court is more likely to find a viable claim.178 The 
Zimmer court noted that Coach Baugh was forty-six years old, 
whereas Zimmer was only eighteen.179 Despite the fact that 
Zimmer had reached the age of majority, the court’s analysis 
indicates that the twenty-eight year age difference—the victim 
still in her teenage years and the harasser in his middle ages—
held great significance in its decision to allow the athlete’s claim 
to proceed to trial. 
The Jennings court similarly quoted the Davis decision to 
highlight the importance of age in sexual harassment cases.180 
The court even acknowledged “that most college coaches (as in 
this case) are going to be older than the men or women that they 
coach,” and that this factor “do[es] place the coach in a more 
powerful position than the college athlete.”181 Notwithstanding 
the court’s acknowledgement, it failed to appreciate the 
graveness of the twenty-eight year age difference between 
Jennings, seventeen years old, and Dorrance, forty-five years 
old, and the fact that Jennings was a minor at the time the 
harassment began. In fact, the majority relegated Jennings’ and 
Dorrance’s ages to a mere footnote.182
The dissenting opinion, however, appropriately considered 
the gravity of the age factor. The opinion begins as follows: 
[W]hen she was seventeen and a member of the 
women’s soccer team at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill . . . , her forty-five-year-old 
male coach, Anson Dorrance, persistently and openly 
177 Davis, 526 U.S. at 653. 
178 See id. 
179 Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15075, at *31 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
180 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 267 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
181 Id. at 274. 
182 See id. at 274 n.13. 
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discussed and pried into the sex lives of his players, 
using what he learned to degrade and humiliate 
them.183
The choice to begin the opinion by focusing on the age 
differential suggests the weight with which the dissent 
considered this factor. The dissent reiterated the age difference 
three more times.184 In one instance, the opinion stated, 
“Dorrance was not simply one man outnumbered by twenty-six 
women. He was a forty-five year-old man probing into the 
sexual activities of young women, some of whom, like Jennings, 
were as young as seventeen.”185 Thus, unlike the dissent, since 
the majority failed to consider the significance of their vast age 
difference and Jennings’ minority status, the court improperly 
diluted the severity of Jennings’ claim. 
3.  The Plaintiff’s Reaction to the Harassing Conduct 
Another factor that courts consider in analyzing Title IX 
hostile environment sexual harassment claims is the plaintiff’s 
reaction, both voluntary and involuntary, to the harasser’s 
conduct or comments. When considering the voluntary reaction 
of a victim, courts are less likely to make a finding of 
harassment where facts suggest that the plaintiff did not take 
active measures to report or eradicate the behavior.186 On the 
other hand, when examining the involuntary reaction of a 
victim, if the plaintiff initially expressed a strong negative 
reaction to the conduct, courts weigh such facts in favor of 
183 Id. at 283 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
184 Id. at 285, 289, 290. 
185 Id. at 290. The other two instances of this reiteration are 1) when the 
dissent quoted Jennings’ description of her experience as a seventeen year old 
in the hotel room with Dorrance, “I was 17 when he asked me [‘Who are 
you fucking?’] in a dark hotel room, knee-to-knee, bed not made, sitting at 
one of those tiny tables,” id. at 285, and 2) when it described Dorrance as a 
“much older and more powerful male coach,” id. at 289. 
186 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 262, 
264 (4th Cir. 2006); Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 
917 n.5, 918 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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finding actionable harassment.187
In Klemencic, the court deemed that the relationship between 
Klemencic and Coach Crawford was evidence that his behavior 
did not create a hostile environment.188 Characterizing the 
relationship as “a good friendship,”189 the court found that there 
was 
no evidence in the record before this Court that 
Klemencic subjectively viewed this conduct as hostile 
or abusive or harassment at the time, and neither does 
this Court. Nor [was] there evidence that this alleged 
conduct had “the effect of unreasonably interfering 
with the plaintiff’s [educational] performance and 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
[educational] environment . . . .”190
In coming to this conclusion, despite the court’s 
acknowledgment that Klemencic refused Crawford’s request to 
begin a relationship on two occasions, it emphasized her failure 
to end all contact with him.191 In other words, despite 
Klemencic’s refusal to date her coach and the offense she took 
from his requests, the court refused to find that the plaintiff 
187 See Klemencic, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 916; Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15075, at *7-*10, *32. 
188 See Klemencic, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 916. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 See id. However, it is important to recognize that the court’s initial 
failure to locate the power disparity of their relationship likely influenced its 
perception of this circumstance. Having failed to understand the nature of this 
relationship, it comes as no surprise that Klemencic’s “decision” not to end 
her “friendship” may have been a vestige of the inherent power imbalance 
between the two. As Celia Brackenridge notes: 
[A] victim of abuse may well reposition herself repeatedly in 
abusive situations . . . . This is certainly a feature of some of 
the testimonies in this research, where women reported having 
endured abusive relationships with their coaches for many years, 
sometimes even after they had recognized the nature of what 
was happening to them. The cycle of dependency, sexual 
attention, guilt and further dependency is very hard to break. 
Brackenridge, supra note 7, at 124. 
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manifested a strong enough adverse reaction to him. 
The court also drew negative conclusions regarding the 
timing of Klemencic’s complaints about Crawford’s conduct. 
First, Klemencic presented the offensive article he sent her as 
evidence of sexual harassment. In examining this allegation, the 
court in a footnote specifically noted that she had not 
complained about the offensive article until over a year after she 
received it.192 The court, moreover, considered the fact that the 
plaintiff only identified the coach’s conduct as creating a hostile 
environment in 1998, although she initiated her lawsuit in 
1994.193 Similarly, in describing the facts of the case, the court 
highlighted that, although the allegations occurred as early as 
1992, Klemencic did not complain to school officials until 
1993.194 The court’s decision to include these facts in its opinion 
indicates that viewed with skepticism the severity of the conduct 
at issue, and therefore, weighed her delayed reporting against a 
finding of actionable harassment. 
Similarly, in Zimmer, the court assessed the athlete’s 
reaction to her coach’s behavior. In delineating the facts of the 
case, the majority explained the steps the athlete took in 
attempting to halt her coach’s inappropriate behavior not long 
after it began.195 Later, in its analysis of the severity and 
pervasiveness of the conduct, the court noted the plaintiff’s 
active and voluntary decision to transfer to a different school.196 
The court additionally noted how the offensive conduct had a 
negative effect on Zimmer’s education by causing her grades to 
drop.197 Thus, Zimmer’s active attempts to stop the improper 
192 Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 917 n.5 (S.D. 
Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001). 
193 Id. at 915. The opinion does not reflect why the plaintiff initiated her 
suit at this time. 
194 Id. at 913-14. 
195 See Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15075, at *7-*8 (N.D. Ohio 2001). During the year in which Baugh 
joined the team, Zimmer met with the University’s athletic director on 
various occasions to discuss the coach’s behavior. Id. at *8. 
196 Id. at *32. 
197 Id. 
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conduct, as well as the negative effects that the behavior had on 
her emotionally, supported the court’s ultimate decision to deny 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 
When the Jennings court evaluated Jennings’ reactions to 
Dorrance’s conduct, it focused on the interaction between 
Jennings and Dorrance in his hotel room.198 First, the court 
characterized Dorrance’s question as “inappropriate.”199 In the 
next sentence, however, it appeared to condone the inquiry due 
to his interest as her coach in the effects of her social activities 
on her academic achievement.200 Next, the court described 
Jennings’ reaction to the question as a “forceful rejection.”201 It 
then concluded that in light of Jennings’ strong reaction, 
Dorrance’s conduct could not be characterized as a “severe” 
example of sexual harassment.202
The court’s interpretation of the interaction between Jennings 
and Dorrance is inconsistent with Klemencic and Zimmer. The 
Klemencic court suggested that the athlete’s passive response to 
her coach’s inquiries did not constitute a strong enough adverse 
reaction; and therefore, his conduct could not be sexual 
harassment. The Zimmer court, on the other hand, reasoned that 
the athlete’s strong disgust and active response to the conduct 
indicated its severity. The Jennings court, departing from 
precedent, viewed the athlete’s strong disgust and active 
response to Dorrance as evidence that his conduct was not 
sexual harassment. 
198 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 273-74 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
199 Id. at 273. 
200 See id. (“As phrased, Dorrance’s question in the hotel room clearly 
was inappropriate. At the same time, as Jennings’ coach, Dorrance certainly 
had an interest in her academic performance and determining whether her 
social life was contributing to her poor academic performance. The question 
was not physically threatening and not a sexual proposition. Rather, it was an 
offensive utterance from a coach to a player in the context of inquiring about 
Jennings’ poor grades—grades that were so poor that she believed her athletic 
eligibility was in jeopardy.”). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
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Furthermore, like Klemencic, the tone and frequency with 
which the majority described the timeline of Jennings’ 
complaints signifies the gravity of this factor in the court’s 
overall analysis. For example, the court observed that on the 
two occasions Jennings met with Ehringhaus, she failed to report 
that Dorrance specifically directed inappropriate comments at 
her.203 The court remarked that Jennings’ father also failed to 
mention Dorrance’s conduct in a complaint he expressed to the 
University.204 When describing her father’s second complaint 
about Dorrance’s behavior, the court explicitly highlighted in 
parentheses that this letter “for the first time” described the 
harassment.205 Hence, the court characterized the timing of her 
complaints as delayed reporting and, therefore, as evidence 
against a finding of severe and pervasive sexual harassment.206
203 Id. at 262. 
204 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 262 (4th 
Cir. 2006). The first letter only complained that Dorrance owed Jennings 
money for Gatorade which she purchased for the team. 
205 Id. at 264. 
206 Although it is necessary to consider whether the victim complained of 
harassment in order to establish the school’s liability under Title IX, Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998), the court did not 
reach this issue. See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 
276 (4th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, a detailed outline of whether and when 
Jennings decided to report Dorrance’s conduct was unnecessary. 
 Regardless, the courts’ evaluations of when plaintiffs chose to complain 
are inconsistent with what scholars know about the reporting of sexual 
harassment. Generally, in situations of sexual harassment the victim’s silence 
is commonplace for a number of reasons. For example, some women remain 
silent because they do not identify the conduct as sexual harassment. Theresa 
M. Beiner, Essay: Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 138 (2001). Others remain 
silent “as a coping strategy to deal with the shame and self-blame that often 
accompany these experiences.” Volkwein et al, supra note 4, at 284 (quoting 
Helen Lenskyj, supra note 6, at 21). Other times, silence is a result of poor 
complaint procedures. Id. Last, victims also may not report out of fear of 
“bad career and personal ramifications. . . .” Beiner, Using Evidence of 
Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, supra, at 138. Because sexual 
harassment is difficult for victims to report, the Jennings court should not 
have given so much weight to the silence of the sexual harassment plaintiff in 
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Although the Jennings court’s consideration of the timing of 
the complaints is consistent with prior cases, it erroneously 
characterized this timeframe as delayed reporting. Jennings first 
reported Dorrance’s improper, sexual conduct to a school 
authority in the fall of 1996, her first season playing soccer.207 
Although Jennings did not explicitly state that he directed the 
conduct and comments at her, she, nevertheless, expressed her 
concern.208 While the court was correct in noting that Jennings 
did not report specific conduct directed at her until later,209 it 
improperly considered the timing factor by overlooking her 
initial reporting effort. 
4.  The Reactions of Others Present to the Offensive Conduct 
In measuring whether the plaintiff’s response to the behavior 
was objectively reasonable, the courts look to the reactions of 
others who witnessed or similarly received the offensive 
conduct.210 If witnesses or victims share a similar repugnance to 
the behavior, courts are more willing to characterize their 
reactions as reasonable and the conduct as severe and pervasive 
sexual harassment.211
In Zimmer, the court explained that other swimmers’ 
complaints about the coach’s conduct were relevant in its 
analysis.212 Specifically, the court noted that other swimmers on 
its analysis. 
207 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 262. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. at 264. 
210 See Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15075, at *31 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
211 See id. at *7, *27 (noting that other swimmers complained about the 
coach’s conduct). 
212 Id. at *27, *31 n.3 (“The specific acts of alleged harassment include: 
Baugh asking when he would see a swimmer in a sexy dress, hitting a 
swimmer on the back-end with a kickboard, fixing a swimmer’s twisted suit 
straps when he had not been asked to do so, entering the women’s locker 
room area while the team was changing, and taking excessive photographs of 
the women team members.”). 
DEANNA.DOC 7/1/2007 11:01 PM 
 TITLE IX AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1305 
                                                          
various occasions felt sufficiently offended to complain about 
their coach’s behavior.213 In fact, some swimmers claimed that 
they personally had been harassed.214 Since other players 
corroborated Zimmer’s allegations, the court found her reaction 
to be reasonable. 
The Jennings court also explored whether others considered 
the conduct sufficiently severe.215 Despite Jennings’ and other 
players’ testimonies, the court found that Jennings’ teammates 
did not consider the conduct and comments to be “offensive.”216 
Rather, the court contended that the athletes appeared to be 
“willing participants” in the conversations about which Jennings 
complained.217 While this assessment may have been true for 
those who were “open about their personal lives,”218 as the 
dissent pointed out, the majority underemphasized facts which 
suggest that other team members felt similarly offended by the 
conduct.219 For example, although the majority acknowledged 
that another teammate, Keller, feared Dorrance, it downplayed 
her testimony.220 The majority additionally overlooked the shock 
that Jennings’ father expressed about Dorrance’s conduct in his 
letter to the University,221 and that the school officials admitted 
213 Id. at *7, *31 n.3. 
214 Id. at 31 n.3. 
215 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 273 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 260. 
219 See id. at 277-78 (majority opinion), 285, 289 (Michael, J., 
dissenting). For example, the dissent reported that “other players [became] 
angry, disgusted, and humiliated by Dorrance’s sexual questions and 
remarks . . . . A few players reacted tearfully, saying, ‘I can’t believe him. 
Why would he say that?’” Id. at 285 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
220 See id. at 278 (majority opinion). “Downplaying the severity of the 
[harasser’s] conduct” is a strategy used by courts to undermine sexual 
harassment claims. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary 
Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 
(1999). For further discussion of this strategy see infra Part IV.A. 
221 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 264 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
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the conduct was improper and reprimanded the coach.222 
Dorrance even confessed that his behavior was 
“inappropriate.”223 Therefore, the court should have weighed 
these other reactions to Dorrance’s conduct in favor of finding 
actionable harassment. 
5.  The Setting in which the Alleged Harassment Took Place 
A fifth factor courts consider is the setting in which the 
alleged harassment took place.224 The courts look to the 
location, what kind of behavior is generally condoned in such 
place, and how many individuals were present when the 
harassment occurred.225
In Zimmer, the court considered the setting in its hostile 
environment analysis. For example, the court noted that 
although the team was dressing in the women’s locker room, 
Baugh chose to enter anyway.226 In weighing the severity of the 
conduct, the court took into account the inherent privacy of the 
women’s locker room by suggesting that the coach’s presence in 
that space as the team dressed was inappropriate.227 
Furthermore, the court highlighted in the facts of its opinion that 
Baugh “made Zimmer stay after practice so that he could ice her 
shoulder while they were alone.”228 While icing an athlete’s 
shoulder is a normal activity for a coach, the court’s emphasis 
indicates that seemingly innocent and appropriate behavior can 
become severely offensive conduct in settings such as isolated or 
private spaces. 
222 See id. at 265. 
223 See id. The school wrote Jennings’ father an apology explaining that 
Dorrance “‘now realizes that his involvement in such discussions is 
inappropriate . . . .’ Dorrance endorsed the apology.” Id. 
224 See, e.g., id. at 272; Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075, at *6, *31 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
225 See, e.g., Jennings, 444 F. 3d at 272; Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15075, at *6, *31 n.3. 
226 Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075, at *31 n.3. 
227 See id. at *31 n.3. 
228 Id. at *6. 
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The Jennings court also took into account the setting in 
which the harassment occurred. In considering this factor, the 
majority focused on the fact that most of the offensive conduct 
occurred in “group settings” where over twenty athletes 
prepared for practice and informally chatted about a range of 
issues including sex.229 The court’s analysis, like that of the 
Zimmer court,230 indicates that one-on-one conduct is more 
severe and that the group setting, at least in part, diffuses the 
seriousness of the conduct. Accordingly, it is surprising that the 
court conspicuously omitted any discussion of the gravity of 
Jennings’ individual encounter with Dorrance in his hotel room. 
Unlike the dissent, the majority failed to truly appreciate the 
intimate nature of the setting and the fact that the two were 
alone.231 The court instead focused predominantly on the 
comment itself, which it characterized as a mere “offensive 
utterance”232 without taking into account how the setting 
exacerbated the impropriety and severity of the remark. Thus, 
the court fell short in its analysis of the setting in which the 
harassment occurred by overlooking the severity of Jennings’ 
individual encounter with Dorrance in a personal and private 
space. 
6.  Direct or Second-Hand Harassment 
Whether the harasser aimed his inappropriate behavior 
directly at the plaintiff or at others in the group setting is 
another important factor courts consider. Although comments 
directed at the complainant are most relevant,233 the atmosphere 
as a whole is particularly important for a hostile environment 
229 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 272 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
230 See Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15075, at *6, *31 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
231 See Jennings, 444 F.3d at 291 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
232 See id. at 273 (majority opinion). 
233 E.g., Jennings, 444 F. 3d at 272; Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15075, at *31. 
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claim.234 Thus, courts evaluate not only conduct directed at 
plaintiffs, but also that which is directed at others—second-hand 
harassment.235
The Zimmer court predominantly focused on the comments 
and behavior the coach directed at the complainant.236 However, 
the court explicitly asserted that “for the purpose of evaluating 
whether Baugh’s conduct created a hostile environment, it is 
relevant that other members of the swim team also claim to have 
been harassed.”237 It then outlined Baugh’s inappropriate 
behavior directed at others, rather than just Zimmer.238 The 
court concluded that a jury could find that such conduct, both 
indirect and direct, rose to the level of actionable harassment.239
Likewise, the Jennings court considered “second-hand” 
harassment.240 Nevertheless, the majority misapplied this factor. 
Like the Zimmer court, the majority understood that comments 
and conduct directed at the plaintiff are of prime importance.241 
However, unlike the Zimmer court and the Jennings dissent, the 
majority did not view the “second-hand” harassment as seriously 
contributing to a finding of a hostile environment and as 
exacerbating the conduct directed explicitly at Jennings.242 
Instead, the court emphasized the fact that Dorrance directed the 
majority of his comments not specifically at Jennings but at 
234 See Jennings, 444 F. 3d at 274; Zimmer, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15075, at *31. 
235 When this Comment refers to second-hand or indirect conduct, it 
means conduct which is directed at others, and therefore, contributing 
indirectly to a hostile environment for the plaintiff. Direct conduct is that 
which is focused at the individual plaintiff. 
236 See Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15075, at *26-*31 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
237 Id. at *31 n.3. 
238 See id. at *31 n.3. 
239 See id. at *32. 
240 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 272 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
241 See id. 
242 See id. at 272 (majority opinion), 288 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
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others as evidence against her claim.243 Nevertheless, as the 
dissent noted, “Jennings . . . was [not, as the majority 
characterized her,] simply a bystander to her fellow teammates’ 
sexual and social banter . . . . Rather, she was caught in a 
hostile environment that was demeaning to young women.”244 
The Jennings court failed to appropriately consider the gravity 
of the “second-hand” harassment in weighing its effect on 
Jennings’ environment as a whole. 
7.  Other Characteristics of the Conduct 
In analyzing the conduct itself, courts tend to consider a 
number of sub-factors. They usually include in their analyses: 
how often the conduct occurred, the type of conduct,245 i.e., 
whether it was physical or verbal and sexual,246 and the tone of 
the comments.247
In Klemencic, the court considered each of the above factors 
in examining the conduct of which the athlete complained.248 
The court concentrated on the frequency of Crawford’s requests 
for Klemencic to date him (two times) and a sexual article which 
the coach mailed to her.249 After reviewing the evidence, the 
court concluded that these three incidents, which occurred over 
a long period of time (at most three years), could not be 
construed as frequent.250
Despite this determination that the improper conduct was 
243 See id. at 272 (majority opinion). 
244 Id. at 288 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
245 See id. at 273; Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 
917 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001); Zimmer v. 
Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075, at *30 
(N.D. Ohio 2001). 
246 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 273 
(4th Cir. 2006); Klemencic, 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 at 916-17; Zimmer, 2001 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15075 at *27, *32. 
247 See Jennings, 444 F.3d at 273, Klemencic, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 917. 
248 See Klemencic, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 915-18. 
249 See id. at 913-14. 
250 Id. at 917. 
DEANNA.DOC 7/1/2007 11:01 PM 
1310 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
                                                          
infrequent, the Klemencic court went on to evaluate the nature of 
the behavior and comments.251 Specifically, the court considered 
whether the conduct was sexual.252 It concluded that, although 
the article could be considered offensive, Crawford’s 
conversations with Klemencic did not include “any explicit 
mention of or request for sexual activity.”253 Because the court 
concluded that the requests were not sexual, this factor seemed 
to weigh heavily against her claim. 
Additionally, the court examined the tone of the comments, 
and, although it admitted that the conduct “may have been 
inappropriate,”254 concluded that it was not “physically 
threatening or humiliating.”255 The court also weighed the fact 
that Crawford eventually accepted Klemencic’s refusal to begin a 
sexual relationship with him against finding actionable 
harassment.256 Hence, the court indicated that not only is verbal 
conduct less serious than physical behavior, but also where 
comments and inquiries are not aggressive, finding actionable 
harassment will be more difficult. 
The Zimmer court conducted an analysis similar to that of 
the Klemencic court. First, the court characterized the coach’s 
behavior as sexual.257 The court then weighed the frequency of 
the harassment, which occurred on a daily basis for many 
months.258 Last, the court weighed the fact that this frequent 
251 Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916-17 (S.D. 
Ohio 1998), aff’d, 263 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001). The fact that the court 
continued to analyze the nature of the conduct after examining its frequency 
suggests that sufficiently severe conduct, though infrequent, may, 
nevertheless, be actionable harassment. 
252 See id. 
253 Id. at 916. 
254 See id. at 917. 
255 Id. 
256 See id. 
257 Zimmer v. Ashland Univ., No. 1:00CV0630, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15075, at *27 (N.D. Ohio 2001). The court noted that the behavior “was of a 
sexual nature” when considering whether the conduct was “discrimination 
based upon sex.” Id. 
258 See id. at *30. 
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behavior was not only verbal but also physical.259 Even though 
the court did not characterize this behavior as aggressive or 
threatening, it found that it was sufficiently humiliating.260 
Unlike in Klemencic, the balance of these interrelated factors of 
frequent physical, verbal, and sexual conduct persuaded the 
court to characterize Baugh’s behavior as sexual harassment. 
The Jennings court too examined the frequency of 
Dorrance’s conduct; however, its analysis evaded consideration 
of important facts. Even though Dorrance frequently pried into 
the sex lives of the young women on the team,261 the court 
concentrated on the fact that Jennings only alleged two specific 
situations where he targeted her.262 By focusing predominantly 
on only these two instances, the court overlooked the pattern of 
inappropriate and offensive behavior which occurred over a long 
period of time, thereby downplaying the pervasiveness of 
Dorrance’s conduct.263
In addition, when analyzing the nature of his conduct, 
although it was blatantly sexual in nature,264 the court 
downplayed its severity.265 For example, the court adamantly 
emphasized the fact that this conduct was not “physically 
threatening.”266 It, thus, failed to appreciate the gravity of the 
verbal comments, which, as illustrated by the dissent, humiliated 
259 See id. at *32. Baugh, for example, pulled down Zimmer’s bathing 
suit strap. Id. at *6. 
260 Id. at *32. 
261 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 260 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
262 See id. at 273. Jennings actually alleged three incidences, which the 
majority acknowledged. However, as the majority pointed out, not even the 
dissent gave any weight to the third allegation in which “a teammate . . . 
asked Jennings whether a man in the stands was her boyfriend and Dorrance 
allegedly was present during the conversation but did not say anything.” Id. 
at 273, 273 n.11. 
263 See discussion about “divide and conquer” infra Part IV.A. 
264 See supra Part II of this note explaining the facts of Jennings. 
265 See discussion about “downplaying the severity of the conduct” infra 
Part IV.A. 
266 See Jennings, 444 F.3d at 273. 
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the players.267
The court also inappropriately characterized the demeaning 
sexual comments as, at most, “offensive utterance[s]”268 and 
“lapses in linguistic gentility.”269 In fact, the court appeared to 
condone the comments because they “hardly painted women in a 
sexually subservient, negative, or demeaning light.”270 
Departing from Zimmer and Klemencic, which merely concluded 
whether or not the conduct was sexual, the court in Jennings, 
overreaching in its judicial role, made excuses for Dorrance and 
downplayed his behavior.271 This improper treatment of 
Jennings’ allegations enabled the court to dilute her claim. 
The Jennings court failed to properly analyze the factors 
relevant to a Title IX claim as outlined in Klemencic and 
Zimmer. Thus, it erroneously affirmed the district court’s 
judgment dismissing Jennings’ claims on summary judgment on 
the basis that Dorrance’s conduct was not sufficiently severe and 
pervasive so as to create an illegally hostile environment. 
IV.  SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE NATURE OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 
Notwithstanding the strength of Jennings’ claims in light of 
prior cases, there are additional policy reasons for which this 
case should have survived summary judgment. This Part argues 
that Jennings is an illustrative example of what scholars have 
identified as the dangers of using summary judgment to dismiss 
such fact-sensitive cases as those involving sexual harassment.272 
267 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 289 
(4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
268 See id. at 273 (majority opinion). 
269 See id. at 274. 
270 See id. at 273. 
271 See id. at 273. 
272 See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: 
USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (2005) 
[hereinafter BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES]; Theresa M. 
Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable 
People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791 (2002) 
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Indeed, the Fourth Circuit endorsed this view in Beardsley v. 
Webb, in which the court refused to grant judgment as a matter 
of law in a hostile environment case.273 At trial, not only may 
juries appropriately serve the fact-finding function,274 but also 
plaintiffs have the opportunity to “tell the stories” of their sexual 
harassment experiences, which facilitates a sufficient evaluation 
of these highly contextual claims.275 Thus, as scholars argue, 
[hereinafter Beiner, Let the Jury Decide]; Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of 
Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
71 (1999) [hereinafter Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment]; M. Isabel 
Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgment, 8 
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311 (1999); Eric Schnapper, Some of 
Them Still Don’t Get It: Hostile Environment Litigation in the Lower Courts, 
1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277 (1999); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of 
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation (Brooklyn Law 
School, Legal Studies Paper No. 71), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=968834. 
273 30 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1994). Although the case did not specifically 
involve summary judgment, the court’s reasoning supports this argument. 
274 Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272; Beiner, The Misuse of 
Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 75; Medina, supra note 272, at 317, 
357-62. 
275 Although not all of the following scholars have chosen to focus their 
work on sexual harassment or the courtroom forum specifically, as opposed 
to any type of legal setting, their arguments regarding the power of 
storytelling support this proposition. See, e.g., Beiner, Using Evidence of 
Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, supra note 206; Richard 
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412-13 (1989) (exploring the power of legal 
storytelling by “outgroup” members to challenge the status quo); Leslie 
Espinoza Garvey, The Race Card: Dealing with Domestic Violence in Courts, 
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 303-04 (2003) (discussing the 
use of “Narrative to be Better Lawyers” and in doing so explaining how 
“[s]tories allow lawyers and clients to communicate about outsider 
experience”); Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Tales of White 
Folk: Doctrine, Narrative, and the Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. 377, 398 (1996) (reviewing Richard Delgado, The Rodrigo 
Chronicles: Conversations about America and Race) (examining “the use of 
storytelling as a method of doctrinal critique”); Minna J. Kotkin, Book 
Review, 55 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 613, 618 (2005) (reviewing BEINER, GENDER 
MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES: USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REFORMULATE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 272) (“[A]s fewer cases are heard in 
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courts should act with special caution when faced with summary 
judgment motions in sexual harassment cases.276
In dismissing a colorable claim on summary judgment and 
neglecting to address the Beardsley opinion, the Jennings court 
failed to exercise such caution.277 In light of warnings about the 
problems manifested by the intersection of gender and summary 
judgment, the Jennings court should have allowed the case to 
proceed to trial. 
A.  The Problem 
Scholars have identified a trend in the courts for deciding 
sexual harassment hostile environment cases on summary 
judgment.278 Although summary judgment is an essential 
element of judicial economy, courts are “too quick” to dismiss 
these cases in this procedural context.279 There are many 
problems with this judicial practice: 1) courts improperly use the 
open court, judges are losing perspective on how “objectionable” conduct 
affects women at work.”); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, 
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 
2104-06 (1989) (explaining the power of legal storytelling); Mari J. Matsuda, 
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 2320, 2322 (1989) (arguing “that outsider jurisprudence—
jurisprudence derived from considering stories from the bottom—will help 
resolve the seemingly irresolvable conflicts of value and doctrine that 
characterize liberal thought”). 
276 See Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272; 
Medina, supra note 272. 
277 Beardsley is cited only as authority stating that sexual harassment 
violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 
444 F.3d 255, 279 (4th Cir. 2006); id. at 293 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
278 See Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 72; 
BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES, supra note 272, at 5-6; 
Medina, supra note 272, at 313-16. Although the focus of these scholars’ 
research is sexual harassment in the workplace environment, many of their 
arguments and findings apply to other settings. 
279 Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 98. See 
also Medina, supra note 272, at 311. See generally Schneider, supra note 
272. 
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tool to decide “close cases”280 where factual issues remain 
unresolved;281 2) the nature of these highly fact-sensitive and 
contextual claims requires a deeper examination, perhaps 
including victims’ testimonies, than can be accomplished through 
mere motions for summary judgment;282 and 3) juries are more 
appropriately situated and institutionally competent to evaluate 
these claims than federal court judges.283 Hence, many courts 
are inappropriately deciding sexual harassment hostile 
environment cases on summary judgment, thereby preventing the 
necessary nuanced analysis of these claims and proper 
development of sexual harassment standards. 
1.  Close Cases 
Although subsequent case law has elaborated on this 
standard, at the most basic level, summary judgment is 
appropriate in cases in which “there [are] no genuine issue[s] as 
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”284 Summary judgment is 
280 Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 98. 
Although Beiner uses the phrase “close case,” she does not explicitly define 
it. It appears that the article uses the phrase to refer to cases where 
reasonable people could differ because the behavior complained of is not so 
explicitly severe, but, on the other hand, not so benign that most people 
would not characterize it as sexual harassment. See also Medina, supra note 
272, at 316; Schnapper, supra note 272, at 305. Schnapper similarly uses the 
phrase “close case” in referencing Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 
428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995). Id. The court in Baskerville appears to describe 
what he calls a close case as one which is “not within the area of certainty.” 
Id. Schnapper also notes that the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift, 510 
U.S. 17, 23 (1993), has used this terminology, though the case does not 
precisely define its definition. Schnapper, supra note 272, at 281. This 
Comment adopts these similar definitions when using the phrase “close case.” 
281 Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 72. 
282 Id. at 102; Medina, supra note 272, at 316. 
283 Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272; Beiner, The Misuse of 
Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 102; Medina, supra note 272, at 357-
71. 
284 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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unsuitable, therefore, in cases where a reasonable fact-finder 
could render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.285 In 
other words, in ambivalent or “close cases,” courts should not 
grant summary judgment motions. 
Instead of yielding to this standard, however, courts 
aggressively dispose of hostile environment cases in ways which 
go beyond the realm of appropriate inquiry on summary 
judgment motions.286 Professor Theresa Beiner has identified 
two troubling strategies employed by judges in granting these 
motions: “divide and conquer” and “downplaying the severity of 
the conduct.”287 With the “divide and conquer” approach, the 
court looks at each “incident in a piecemeal manner.”288 In 
doing so, the court blatantly ignores the totality-of-the-
circumstances standard, which requires a more holistic view of 
the claim.289 By using the “downplaying the severity of the 
conduct” approach, the court’s choice of rhetoric simply 
undermines the claim.290 Although summary judgment will 
285 See id. 
286 See BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES, supra note 
272, at 6; Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 74; 
Medina, supra note 272, at 313-16. 
287 BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES, supra note 272, at 
21-28; Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272, at 808; Beiner, The 
Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 105 (citing an example of a 
Seventh Circuit case in which the court used the “divide and conquer” 
approach). See generally Schneider, supra note 272. 
288 Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272, at 808. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 809. Beiner cites an illustrative example of this strategy. In 
Hosey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. AW-95-196, 1996 WL 414057, (D.C. Md. 
1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir. 1997), 
a female supervisor at a McDonald’s restaurant made unwanted 
sexual advances toward a male subordinate. Specifically, she 
asked him out on numerous occasions and made offensive 
comments to him, including telling him “she would like to know 
what it felt like to have [him] inside her.” She also touched him 
offensively on ten occasions including grabbing his rear end and 
pinching him. 
Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272, at 809 (internal citations 
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certainly be appropriate in some cases,291 courts are 
inappropriately “pushing the envelope beyond the scope of 
factual situations deserving of summary judgment.”292
2.  The Nature of Hostile Environment Claims 
The nature and standard of hostile environment claims also 
make it difficult to determine which conduct is “reasonable,” 
especially in the summary judgment context where one’s claims 
are confined to papers and motions.293 To determine whether 
conduct rises to the level of “severe and pervasive,” the fact-
finder must examine the “totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether a reasonable person” would find actionable 
harassment.294 This standard is highly fact-sensitive and 
contextual.295 A sufficient evaluation of the claims requires a 
“close examination of the facts and an assessment of those facts 
omitted). 
 Despite these facts, the District Court concluded that “Title IX does not 
prohibit teenagers from asking each other out on dates.” Id. Hence, the court 
found as a matter of law that the conduct was not severe or pervasive and 
granted summary judgment for the employer. Id. at 809. The Circuit court 
affirmed. Id. 
 Beiner explains the problem with the decision: 
Considering the number of incidents, this case seems to be about 
more than teenagers asking each other out on dates. The plaintiff 
was subjected to repeated acts of a sexual nature, which 
included offensive touching. By reducing the incidents merely to 
“teenagers . . . asking each other out on dates,” the court 
downplayed both the severity (the physical touching) and the 
pervasiveness (repetitive nature) of the behavior. This, in part, 
laid the foundation for summary judgment in this case. 
Id. at 810 (internal citations omitted). 
291 Even Professor Beiner admits that “[n]ot every case must go to the 
jury.” Id. at 844. 
292 Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 74. 
293 Id. at 118, 102 (“It is difficult for a court, on papers alone, to 
determine the atmosphere of the work environment and how it might be 
perceived by an employee working in that environment.”). 
294 Id. at 74 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc, 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). 
295 Id. at 74, 95-96, 118. 
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based on community standards of what is appropriate.”296 
Indeed, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, sitting for the Second Circuit, 
noted, “[c]haracterizing behavior as sexually harassing can only 
be accomplished in a specific context . . . . The answer often 
depends upon perceptions of the circumstances.”297 These claims 
also often require the fact-finder to weigh the credibility of 
competing witnesses and stories.298 Hence, for fact-finders to 
better understand the circumstances and the merits of the 
allegations, the nature of these claims may necessitate more 
extensive discovery and an opportunity for a trial where, for 
example, witnesses may testify and attorneys can cross-examine 
them.299
Other scholars might agree that the opportunity for claimants 
to testify and “tell their stories” in the courtroom will allow for 
a more appropriate judgment. Scholars have long touted the 
power of storytelling to convey information and promote 
understanding, especially between “outgroups”300 and the status 
quo.301 Stories are excellent tools to promote these goals 
296 Id. at 96. 
297 Medina, supra note 272, at 370 (citing Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 
F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
298 Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 96, 
118, 133. See also Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual 
Harassment Cases, supra note 206, at 117, 141-42. 
299 Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 102, 
118, 133 (“Given the nature of these claims and the credibility determinations 
they entail, only the ultimate fact-finder, after hearing the entire case, should 
be permitted to make this determination in most cases” (emphasis added).); 
Kotkin, supra note 275, at 618 (“[J]udges need to listen to women to 
understand the true harm caused by sexual harassment. Not surprisingly, as 
fewer cases are heard in open court, judges are losing perspective on how 
‘objectionable’ conduct affects women at work.”); Medina, supra note 272, 
at 316. 
300 Delgado, supra note 275, at 2412. Delgado uses the term to describe 
“groups whose marginality defines the boundaries of the mainstream, whose 
voice and perspective—whose consciousness—has been suppressed, devalued, 
and abnormalized.” Id. 
301 See, e.g., id. at 2439-40; Garvey, supra note 275, at 302-04 
(“Stories allow lawyers and clients to communicate about outsider 
experience.”); Hayman & Levit, supra note 275, at 399-400, 421; Massaro, 
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because of their ability to illuminate details and contexts.302 
Professors Hayman and Levit explain, “[s]tories . . . are 
contextualized, highly particularized, and very congregate . . . . 
[T]hey afford a special emphasis to personal details, to nuanced 
characterizations, to the richness of human experience.”303 
Stories also call listeners to take into account a spectrum of 
differences involving “cultural, social and economic factors.”304 
Stories, therefore, are an important way to convey sexual 
harassment claims, which require illustration and examination of 
highly factual and contextual allegations.305
Scholars exalt additional aspects of storytelling which 
uniquely promote understanding between dissimilar groups. 
Professor Delgado explains that the “allure [of stories] will often 
provide the most effective means of overcoming otherness, of 
supra note 275, at 2104-06; Matsuda, supra note 275, at 2323. See also 
Janette Kenner Muir & Kathryn Mangus, Talk About Sexual Harassment: 
Women’s Stories on a Woman’s Story, in CONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT AS DISCURSIVE PRACTICE 91, 92-94 (Shereen G. Bingham ed., 
1994) (discussing the power of storytelling to promote understanding and 
communication but focusing on “its particular importance for women”). 
302 See, e.g., Hayman & Levit, supra note 275, at 399-400; Massaro, 
supra note 275, at 2105 (1989) (“[S]torytelling is part of an overall ‘call to 
context . . . .’”). 
303 Hayman & Levit, supra note 275, at 399. 
304 Id. at 430. 
305 E.g., Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 
133 (“[I]t is very difficult for a court to determine what the environment is 
like at a particular place of employment without hearing the witnesses 
describe it live. The problem is exacerbated by the courts ignoring the 
applicable standard in these cases—that the harassment be judged by the 
‘totality of the circumstances.’ This is necessarily a very fact-specific inquiry 
that does not lend itself to determination on a motion for summary 
judgment.”); Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual 
Harassment Cases, supra note 206, at 142 (arguing that women’s stories, as 
“social science testimony” regarding sexual harassment, would serve as 
important evidence in conveying the reality of victims’ experiences, and 
suggesting that stories are powerful tools for contextualizing and facilitating 
the understanding of these claims); Muir & Mangus, supra note 301, at 92-96 
(discussing “the power of storytelling as public discourse to reconstruct 
understandings of sexual harassment” specifically). 
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forming a new collectivity based on the shared story.”306 In 
describing how he believes stories achieve this goal, Professor 
Delgado elucidates: 
Stories humanize us. They emphasize our differences 
in ways that can ultimately bring us close together. 
They allow us to see how the world looks from 
behind someone else’s spectacles. They challenge us 
to wipe off our own lenses and ask, “Could I have 
been overlooking something all along?” 
. . . Hearing stories invites hearers to participate, 
challenging their assumptions, jarring their 
complacency, lifting their spirits, lowering their 
defenses. 
Stories are useful tools for the underdog because they 
invite the listener to suspend judgment. . . .307
Professor Massaro similarly explains that “narrative may be 
a particularly powerful means of facilitating empathic 
understanding: a concrete story comes closest to actual 
experience and so may evoke our empathic distress response 
more readily than abstract theory.308 Thus, storytelling serves as 
an important tool for victims testifying about their sexual 
harassment experience to a fact-finder, who may hold both 
different personal characteristics and viewpoints from the 
victim.309 Not only may stories further a fact-finder’s 
understanding of the victim’s claim, but also it may help him 
overcome pre-existing beliefs hostile to that claim.310 When a 
306 Delgado, supra note 275, at 2438. In more detail, Delgado explains 
that the status quo develops complacency from “comforting stories” which 
justify its privilege. However, “counterstories” told by those who are not a 
part of the dominant group can begin to overcome that complacency. Id. 
307 Id. at 2440. 
308 Massaro, supra note 275, at 2105. 
309 See Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment 
Cases, supra note 206, at 117, 141-42; BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING 
REALITIES, supra note 272, at 7 (explaining that “race, gender, and political 
affiliation” affect the results of sex discrimination lawsuits.). 
310 See Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment 
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judge grants a motion for summary judgment, he prevents the 
realization of these benefits.311
Cases, supra note 206, at 117, 141-142. In this way, victims’ stories are 
essential in advancing changes in social and cultural perceptions of sexual 
harassment. See also Kotkin, supra note 275, at 618 (“It is worth 
remembering that feminist legal theory largely grew out of listening to 
women’s stories.”); Muir & Mangus, supra note 301, at 96 (“[A]s the stories 
[about sexual harassment] are told we may come to understand the 
complexities of the issue better. By naming the action that has made a woman 
uncomfortable, defining the terms that denote such an experience, we may 
come closer to establishing a vocabulary that can capture the essence of the 
sexual harassment experience.”). 
311 Although some scholars support this idea, other commentators are 
skeptical about the benefits of storytelling at trial. See Mary Coombs, Telling 
the Victim’s Story, 2 TEXAS J. OF WOMEN & L. 277, 277-78, 303-14 (1993) 
(arguing that because the ultimate goal of a victim of sexual violation is to 
win her case, she must shape her story in such a way that will convince the 
fact finder to believe her; hence, “[t]he process of crafting a story that is as 
consistent as possible with current understandings of what qualifies as a true 
story of sexual violation leaves those understandings unchallenged;” she 
suggests instead that women tell their stories in nonlitigation forums); Kristin 
Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism, 
42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 85 (1987) (arguing that it may not be productive 
for the victim to tell her story in court “because it is not the victim’s 
perception of experience that frames the questions;” the defense counsel will 
characterize the victim’s words to her detriment). 
 Nevertheless, despite possible disadvantages of storytelling, the benefits 
still serve important purposes as demonstrated by the scholars cited in this 
Comment. Specifically, in response to Coombs, hopefully more women will 
come forward whose stories will begin to topple those assumptions and 
understandings. 
 Scholars have identified other important benefits of storytelling. See, 
e.g., THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE (2004) 
(emphasizing the healing power of storytelling in the courtroom as well as its 
contribution to moral justice for the claimant); Tom Galbraith, Storytelling: 
The Anecdotal Antidote, 28 LITIGATION 17, 23 (2002) (describing his 
experience with wronged clients who just needed to tell their stories, 
Galbraith writes: 
[C]lients often feel a need to have their story told and to 
experience the catharsis this produces. Almost every litigator 
who has been at this business for a decade or more will share 
this experience. In one case, I negotiated such a miraculously 
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3.  Juries v. Judges 
Another problem presented by the dismissal of sexual 
harassment claims on summary judgment is that the nature of 
hostile environment claims requires juries, rather than judges, to 
serve the fact-finding function in meritorious cases.312 
“Traditionally, and as mandated by the Constitution in common 
law actions for damages, juries are the quintessential finders of 
facts and the entity in which our system places the ability to 
judge credibility, reliability and sincerity of witnesses and other 
evidence.”313 Juries are more competent to determine what a 
“reasonable” person would consider harassment; they represent 
a more diverse cross-section of society than the judiciary and are 
better situated to determine community standards.314 In fact, 
there is evidence based on a comparative analysis of courts’ 
perceptions and community standards of sexual harassment 
which indicates that judges differ from what “reasonable” people 
favorable settlement that I felt compelled to browbeat a 
recalcitrant client into accepting it. The same month I 
passionately urged a different client’s cause in court and suffered 
a crushing defeat. The first client, notwithstanding his ill-
deserved success, hated me; the second remains a fan. 
Id. 
 Although this situation focuses on the decision to choose settlement over 
litigation, it reflects the importance of trials for victims). See also, Muir & 
Mangus, supra note 301, at 92-96 (explaining how storytelling functions to 
promote healing for victims, create communities based on the shared 
experiences of sexual harassment, and encourage women to come forward to 
share their own stories and histories). 
312 Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 75; 
Medina, supra note 272, at 357-371; Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 
272. 
313 Medina, supra note 272, at 317; see also Beiner, The Misuse of 
Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 75 (“[The severe and pervasive 
standard] is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry based on social norms that are 
best assessed by a jury—not one judge sitting in isolation.”). 
314 Medina, supra note 272, at 317; Beiner, The Misuse of Summary 
Judgment, supra note 272, at 118-20. 
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believe is harassment.315 Clearly, this discrepancy is problematic 
in the context of judges evaluating sexual harassment claims on 
summary judgment.316 If judges continue to usurp jury power in 
deciding these cases, standards of sexual harassment will never 
come to fruition.317
As demonstrated, not only do judges differ from juries 
regarding what they consider harassment, but also many appear 
to be inimical and unsympathetic to sexual harassment claims, 
using such strategies as “divide and conquer” and “downplaying 
the severity of the conduct” to dismiss them.318 There is also 
evidence that sexist attitudes still prevail in the judicial 
system.319 Perhaps these reasons explain why plaintiffs alleging 
sexual harassment claims are more successful before juries than 
judges.320
315 Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272, at 794-96, 842-44. See 
also BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES, supra note 272, at 42-
43. 
316 See Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272, at 794-96, 842-44. 
See also BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES, supra note 272, at 
42-43. 
317 Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272, at 820; Medina, supra 
note 272, at 311, 357-362. Indeed, judges may hinder victims from educating 
the public about what they believe is actionable harassment by preventing 
their cases from going forward and their stories from being told. See this Part 
supra n.310 (discussing Kotkin and Muir & Mangus). 
318 Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, supra note 272, at 808. See also 
BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES, supra note 272, at 21-28. 
319 Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 124-33 
(citing various taskforces and studies); BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING 
REALITIES, supra note 272, at 7 (“There are also some disturbing recent 
studies showing the influence of race, gender, and political affiliation in the 
decision outcomes in sex discrimination cases that have implications for 
harassment cases.”). 
320 BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES, supra note 272, at 
6 (basing her conclusion on data which suggests that plaintiffs are more 
successful generally before juries than judges). 
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B.  Beardsley v. Webb321—One Fourth Circuit Perspective 
The Fourth Circuit in Beardsley v. Webb appeared to 
endorse this overall view that the judiciary lacks institutional 
competency in evaluating hostile environment claims.322 In 
Beardsley, a Title VII hostile environment case, the plaintiff 
alleged that her supervisor Webb called her pet names such as 
“honey” and “dear,” “touched [and] . . . massaged her 
shoulders,” accused her of having an affair, inquired about her 
underwear and birth control, and indicated that he wanted to kiss 
her.323 Although the jury at the trial level returned a judgment in 
favor of Beardsley, Webb appealed arguing that the court erred 
in denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law.324 The 
Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument and held, 
“[w]hether Webb’s ‘harassment was sufficiently severe or 
pervasive is quintessentially a question of fact.’”325 Therefore, 
the outcome “depended largely on the credibility of the 
witnesses and the inferences the jury could reasonably draw 
from the facts.”326 By recognizing the fact-sensitive nature of 
sexual harassment cases, the court hinted at the notion that, 
when confronted with motions for summary judgment, judges 
should be mindful that the full breadth of the allegations may not 
321 30 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1994). 
322 See id. at 530. The court appears to endorse the view regarding the 
fact-sensitive nature of the claims and the competency of judges vs. juries in 
deciding these cases. This Comment does not argue that the court appears to 
adopt all of the underlying reasons why juries are better suited for this role, 
such as the evidence which suggests that judges may be hostile to these 
claims discussed supra Part IV.B.3. 
323 Beardsley, 30 F.3d at 528. 
324 Id. at 529. The court’s logic regarding judgments as a matter of law 
applies to summary judgment. 
325 Id. at 530 (citing Paroline v. Unisys. Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th 
Cir. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir. 
1990) (en banc), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lissau 
v. Southern Food Serv., Civ. Action 95-487-R, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16545, *5-6 (W.D. Va. Oct. 10, 1996)). 
326 Beardsley, 30 F.3d. at 530 (citing Paroline, 879 F.2d at 105) 
(emphasis added). 
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unravel until after trial and the judiciary is not institutionally 
competent to determine these claims. Hence, the court suggested 
that summary judgment is ill-suited for these types of cases.327
327 Some courts follow similar reasoning to Beardsley. See Schnapper, 
supra note 272, at 282, 294-307 (1999) (describing the “approaches that the 
circuit courts have taken toward the roles of judges and juries in hostile work 
environment cases” and pointing to various cases including some noted in this 
footnote for more emphasis); Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 
1038 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the summary judgment standard requiring 
that no genuine issues of material fact exist “is applied with added rigor in 
employment discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are crucial 
issues”); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338 (8th Cir. 1994) (involving 
employment discrimination as well). 
 Others do not follow the Beardsley reasoning and have held that 
“whether the challenged conduct rises to a level sufficient to create a hostile 
work environment is a legal question that a court may address on summary 
judgment motion.” Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 987 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 
(M.D. Ala. 1997) (citations omitted). See also Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 
F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating “whether the conduct found is 
sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute sexual harassment is a question 
of law reviewed de novo”); Stacy v. Shoney’s Inc., 955 F. Supp. 751, 755 
(E.D. Ky. 1997) (citation omitted). Even within the Fourth Circuit there 
appears to be confusion on this matter. See Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., 123 
F.3d 766, 774 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that in the sexual harassment case 
before the court “there [were] no questions of fact” in upholding a partial 
summary judgment claim against an employee). For further analysis of this 
issue see Schnapper, supra note 272, at 282, 294-307 (1999). 
 At least two commentators also encourage courts to resolve these cases 
on summary judgment. They argue that judges who restrict decision-making 
in these cases prevent the development of harassment standards, which in 
turn hinders certainty and predictability in the law. See Shira A. Scheindlin & 
John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 813, 815 (1999) (“Unless judges take a more active role in deciding 
harassment cases, there is little possibility that an adequate definition of 
‘hostile work environment’ will develop. Although juries undoubtedly have 
an important part to play, allowing them the authority to define the term on a 
case-by-case basis, as some recommend, will guarantee continued 
confusion.”). They also argue that since juries do not create precedent, future 
juries may treat similar parties differently, which is unfair. See id. at 834 
(explaining why this policy would be unfair, the authors cite 
The Supreme Court [which] has observed in the Fourth 
Amendment context that “[a] policy of sweeping deference 
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C.  Summary Judgment and Jennings 
Jennings is illustrative of the problems created by the courts’ 
propensity to grant summary judgment in hostile environment 
cases. Jennings is a “close case” as evidenced in part by the 
vigorous dissent.328 The fact that University officials and 
Jennings’ father also considered Dorrance’s behavior 
“inappropriate”329 further evidences the ambiguity of the case. 
would permit, ‘[i]n the absence of any significant difference in 
the facts, the Fourth Amendment’s incidence [to] turn[] on 
whether different trial judges draw general conclusions that the 
facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute probable cause.’ 
Such varied results would be inconsistent with the idea of a 
unitary system of law.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
697 (1996) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
171 (1949))).
Finally, these commentators argue that summary judgment is necessary to 
promote judicial economy and facilitate settlements. See id. 844-45. 
 However, this Comment contends that these counterarguments do not 
hold weight against the arguments of the scholars included in this Part, 
including Beiner and Medina. First, if judges continue to grant summary 
judgment in order to develop sexual harassment standards, although case law 
will better guide lower courts’ decision-making, the resulting doctrine will be 
inconsistent with community standards. See Beiner, Let the Jury Decide, 
supra note 272, at 794-96, 842-44 (2002). See also BEINER, GENDER MYTHS 
V. WORKING REALITIES, supra note 272, at 42-43. Second, although 
summary judgment is important to promote judicial economy, clearly it 
should not come at the cost of dismissing potentially valid claims. See Beiner, 
The Misuse of Summary Judgment, supra note 272, at 133. Last, Professor 
Kotkin has identified costs of settlement that also outweigh the benefit of 
judicial economy. See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible 
Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 927 (2006) (arguing that settlements 
which are private “make discrimination in the workplace itself invisible . . . . 
Invisibility defeats the intent of the discrimination statutes; skews empirical 
studies of discrimination litigation . . . ; and hampers lawyers’ ability to 
counsel and negotiate on behalf of discrimination claimants.”). 
328 Nevertheless, this Comment maintains that the Jennings case was 
exceedingly strong enough to withstand the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment. 
329 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 264-65 (4th 
Cir. 2006). 
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Certainly issues of fact existed as to whether these numerous 
sexual comments, which Dorrance directed at Jennings and 
which permeated the entire athletics environment, rose to the 
level of severe and pervasive harassment. Moreover, Jennings’ 
claims closely depended on the unique context of the 
intercollegiate athletics environment identified by numerous 
scholars.330 Not without a trial could Jennings have sufficiently 
illustrated and contextualized her allegations within that 
environment. 
Additionally, Jennings would likely have benefited from an 
evaluation by a jury, which would have been more appropriate. 
The majority appeared unreceptive and unsympathetic to her 
claims, and at times engaged in the two strategies identified by 
Professor Beiner: “downplaying the severity of the conduct”331 
and “divide and conquer.”332 For example, the court frequently 
“downplayed the severity” of Jennings’ allegations by 
characterizing Dorrance’s comments as “offensive 
utterance[s]”333 and “lapses in linguistic gentility.”334 It further 
diluted the gravity of the verbal harassment by focusing on the 
fact that it was not “physically threatening.”335 Indeed, the court 
issued a reminder that, despite the inappropriateness of his 
blatantly sexual inquiry into Jennings’ sex life in his hotel room, 
it was “not a sexual proposition.”336 The court additionally 
distinguished the inquiries Dorrance directed at Jennings from 
the environment as a whole, rather than viewing them in light of 
the entire atmosphere infused with his harassing behavior.337 
Perhaps a jury would not have been as hostile and disparaging to 
Jennings’ claims. 
Although proper use of summary judgment is important in 
330 See supra introduction. 
331 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
332 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
333 See Jennings, 444 F.3d at 273. 
334 See id. at 274. 
335 See Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 273 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
336 Id. 
337 See id. 
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all cases, to echo the voices of previous scholars, courts should 
be particularly cautious in granting these motions in this context. 
The Jennings court did not exercise such caution. Instead, in 
stark contrast with the Fourth Circuit Beardsley decision, the 
Jennings court rather aggressively and erroneously defeated 
Jennings’ allegations. 
CONCLUSION 
The reality of . . . [the] epidemic and pandemic 
proportions [of sexual harassment] cannot be 
underestimated, questioned, or tolerated,338 nor can its 
insidious nature and repercussions be dismissed.339
 
The Jennings court erred in affirming the district court’s 
decision granting summary judgment on the basis that the 
alleged conduct did not create a hostile environment under Title 
IX. In light of Zimmer and Klemencic, the Jennings court did 
not properly consider the totality and gravity of the 
circumstances of Jennings’ claim, including the underlying 
intercollegiate athletics environment, in evaluating her 
allegations under the severe and pervasive standard. It also 
failed to appreciate the inappropriateness of summary judgment 
in such a “close case.” Presenting Jennings as an example, this 
Comment echoes the voices of scholars in urging courts to be 
mindful of the problems associated with granting summary 
judgment in sexual harassment cases and to exercise proper 
caution when faced with these motions in this context. 
338 Robin P. Clair, Hegemony and Harassment: A Discursive Practice, in 
CONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS DISCURSIVE PRACTICE 59, 59 
(Shereen G. Bingham ed., 1994) (citing J.M. Hanley, Sexual Harassment in 
the Federal Government: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Investigations 
of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 96th Cong. 96-57 (1979) (internal citation replaced with 
footnote). 
339 Id. at 59. 
